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COMMENT
PRESCRIBING SOLIDARITY: CONTRIBUTING TO THE
INDEMNITY DILEMMA
During the last supreme court term two decisions' werehanded
down that have the potential to affect profoundly Louisiana law gov-
erning solidary obligors. The first case, Thomas v. W & W Clarklift,
Inc.,2 presented a complex factual situation. The plaintiff, an
employee of Dennis Sheen Transfer Company, was injured when a
forklift fell on him. The machine had been purchased as a used item
from W & W Clarklift, which had overhauled it.' Suit was instituted
against W & W Clarklift and its insurer, under theories of neg-
ligence and breach of warranty.' Some twenty-nine months after the
employee's action had been filed, the defendants brought third party
demands5 against officers and supervisory personnel of Dennis
Sheen Transfer, averring negligence in failing to discover the fork-
lift's unsafe condition and seeking contribution or indemnity.' After
the trial court dismissed the demands, the fourth circuit affirmed7
by sustaining the peremptory exception of prescription' of one
year's lapse.9 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed and ruled that
1. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980); Thomas v. W & W Clarklift,
Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
2. 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
3. Id. at 377.
4. Id
5. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1111 provides, in pertinent part: "The defendant in a
principal action . . . may bring in any person, including a codefendant, who is his war-
rantor, or who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the principal demand."
(Emphasis added).
6. 375 So. 2d at 377.
7. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 365 So. 2d 913, 918 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
8. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 927 states that "[tihe objections which may be raised
through the peremptory exception include . . . (1) Prescription.
9. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3536 provides:
The following actions are also prescribed by one year:
That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages
caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses.
That which a possessor may institute, to have himself maintained or restored
to his possession, when he has been disturbed or evicted.
That for the delivery of merchandise or other effects, shipped on board any
kind of vessels.
That for damage sustained by merchandise on board ships, or which may
have happened by ships running foul of each other.
As should be apparent from the other types of actions limited by article 3536 to one
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W & W Clarklift may have been a solidary obligor with the Dennis
Sheen Transfer supervisory employees." Since further development
of the facts could result in a finding that a relationship in solido ex-
isted, the court reasoned that the intra-debtor action" might not
have prescribed."
year's life, the time period stated is somewhat arbitrary.
In addition, the court of appeal maintained the exception of no cause of action. 365
So. 2d at 915. The Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that "[tihe crux of the Court of
Appeal holding . . .[was] that W & W Clarklift and .. .[the supervisory personnel of
Dennis Sheen Transfer] are not joint tortfeasors and thus not solidary obligors." 375
So. 2d at 377. Moreover, the supreme court believed that the court of appeal so reasoned
on the assumption that the allegedly concurrent negligence was that of the super-
visory personnel and one or more of the W & W Clarklift employees. Additionally, "in
their view an employer only vicariously liable because of employee negligence is solidarily
liable neither with its employees nor with the concurrently negligent tortfeasor." Id
10. Id. at 378. The qualification of the court's decision stems from the procedural
posture of the lower court rulings. The facts necessary to establish that W & W Clark-
lift and Dennis Sheen Transfer's supervisory personnel were solidarily bound had yet
to be developed. But the court noted that
[ilf the record evidence at the trial of the instant cases disclose that negligence on
the part of an employee ... of W & W Clarklift is the only negligence for which
W & W Clarklift is liable, but also establishes negligence on the part of... [Den-
nis Sheen Transfer's supervisory officers], solidarity will result, notwithstanding
W & W Clarklift is only vicariously liable.
Id. (emphasis added). The court's choice of language is confusing. The solidarity that
should obtain between the employer, answerable for his employee-debtor, and the
third person concurrently negligent with the employee is for the benefit of the plain-
tiff-creditor; the categorization does not control the intra-debtor relationships. Among
the obligors, after the creditor has been satisfied, the vicariously liable employer
should be permitted recovery from the third party, who was personally negligent. If
the third person is a corporation, difficulties arise; a corporation cannot be personally
negligent. And if the third party's obligation to the primary plaintiff is a function of
respondeat superior, the confrontation between the debtors pits vicarious liability ver-
sus vicarious liability. Surely then neither party may be totally reimbursed. However,
when one of the corporate obligors may be termed "negligent" as a result of the ac-
tions of executive officers that speak for the corporate entity, the obligor indebted to
the primary plaintiff solely as a matter of social policy may be allowed an indemnity
action against the "negligent" corporate obligor. See notes 263-73, infra, and accompa-
nying text.
11. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103; Morris v. Kospelich, 253 La. 413, 218 So. 2d 316
(1969). See also Chamallas, Comparative Fault and Multiple Party Litigation in Lou-
isian" A Sampling of the Problems, 40 LA. L. REV. 373, 377 (1980).
12. 375 So. 2d at 378. Justice Calogero, writing for the majority, summarized the
court's view:
We determine that the claim for contribution may not prescribe before the right
to contribution vests. The right to enforce contribution is not complete until pay-
ment of the common obligation; thus, prescription does not begin to run against a
claim for contribution until the cast co-tortfeasor has been required to pay the
common debt.
Id, citing Appalachian Corp., Inc. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922). The court's reference to Appalachian Corporation seems inaccurate since it
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Foster v. Hampton,"3 the second ground-breaking opinion ren-
dered last term, also treated the employer's legal responsibility for
the wrongful acts of his employees." In Foster, the plaintiff suffered
authorized an indemnity action. See notes 263-73, infra, and accompanying text. How-
ever, the issue raised is significant. Classifying the defendants as solidarily bound for
the debt is a benefit to the plaintiff since a suit against one solidary obligor interrupts
prescription as to all so liable. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2097. Indeed the secondary effects of
solidarity in the creditor's favor are numerous.
Classifying the debtors as obligors in solidum, or imperfectly bound solidary
obligors, is more consistent with the Civil Code. The Civil Code does not expressly
hold the Thomas-type of debtors to be solidarily liable nor do they answer by reason of
performing the same act; hence, perfect solidarity should not be the rule. Yet, the
desired result would not have been reached through use of the in solidum doctrine,
since longstanding Louisiana jurisprudence holds that a legal action instituted against
one imperfectly bound obligor does not interrupt prescription as to all. See, e.g., Cline
v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889); Gay & Co. v. Blanchard, 32
La. Ann. 497 (1880); Britton & Moore v. Bush, 31 La. Ann. 264 (1879); Corning & Co. v.
Wood, 15 La. Ann. 168 (1860); Hickman v. Stafford, 2 La. Ann. 792 (1847); Jacobs v.
Williams, 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845); 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, nos. 777-79
at 416-17 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); J. SMITH, LOUISIANA AND COMPARATIVE
MATERIALS ON CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS 352 (4th ed. 1973); Comment, Solidary Obli-
gations, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217, 230 (1951). Thus, the end sought in Thomas could have
been reached, in this instance, by overruling this line of cases. After all, the proposi-
tion was well accepted then that the only difference between perfect and imperfect
solidarity pertained to prescription. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1973-1974 Term-Obligations, 35 LA. L. REV. 280, 297 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
1973-1974 Term]. Furthermore, a holding that commencement of suit against one im-
perfectly bound solidary obligor interrupts the running of prescription as to the other
would have obviated the rather unfortunate reference made by the court regarding the
rights of contribution and co-tortfeasors. Concluding that debtors are solidarily bound
for the creditor's benefit does not necessarily mean that the obligors are co-tortfeasors
or that contribution is the rule between them. Perhaps the citation of Appalachian
Corporation is more telling than the court's terminology.
13. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1979).
14. Previously, the supreme court had decided another issue in this lengthy, pro-
tracted litigation. In 1977 the court ruled that a sheriff is not personally liable for the
tortious acts of a deputy committed during the course and scope of his duties. Foster
v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197, 200-01 (La. 1977). Additionally, the parish was not respon-
sible for the deputy's wrongdoing. Id at 203. But the court realized that the "doctrine
of respondeat superior might be available to hold the State vicariously liable for the
negligent torts of its employee in the course and scope of his employment." Id. at
201-02. While the majority stated that Louisiana law is "well settled that the deputy
sheriff is an officer of the state," id. at 201 (emphasis added), the court apparently
assumed that "officer" was but a synonym for servant under the particular circum-
stances. Consequently, the state could be held answerable under Civil Code article
2320 for the deputy's acts. The recent Foster opinion does not dwell on this issue but
simply summarizes that:
In Foster v. Hampton . . . plaintiff . . . was held to have no cause of action
against the Sheriff and Parish of East Baton Rouge. This court there stated that
the defendant deputy sheriff ... was an officer and employee of the State of Loui-
siana.
381 So. 2d at 790 (La. 1980) (emphasis added).
Given the court's hint in its first opinion that the state was the solvent debtor that
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damages claimed to have been caused by an East Baton Rouge
Parish deputy sheriffs negligent driving. The plaintiffs petition
stated that the deputy had been driving a vehicle belonging to the
sheriffs department while "acting in his official capacity."15 More
than a year after the accident, the plaintiff amended his pleading to
name the state as a defendant. Predictably, the state raised the
peremptory exception of prescription, which the trial and the in-
termediate appellate courts maintained. Specifically, the first circuit
held that "the deputy sheriff and the State were not solidary
obligors . . ."" Consequently, bringing suit against the deputy
sheriff failed to interrupt the running of prescription against the
state. 7 With Justice Watson writing for the majority, the supreme
court reversed and held:
When a servant's actions during his employment create an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, any resulting liability is
solidary with that of his master. The injured party has only one
cause of action against both, and suit against either the
employer or employee will interrupt prescription as to the
other. 8
Moreover, while the Foster court recognized that the relation-
ship between the master and servant vis-i-vis the plaintiff for the
employee's delicts has been characterized as imperfect solidarity,'"
the plaintiff was seeking, it is of little wonder that, as Professor Murchison points out,
"Foster took the court's suggestion and sued the state." The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term--Local Government Law, 39 LA. L. REV.
843, 875 n.155 (1979). And, viewing the history of Foster's woes, it is no surprise that the
court was especially receptive to his case. A less attractive factual situation well may
have produced a different result. Foster's approach and tenor should be compared with
the analysis employed in Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972).
15. 352 So. 2d at 199.
16. 381 So. 2d at 790.
17. 1&
18. Id. at 791. However, the opinion clearly states that the employer and the
employee are not joint tort-feasors. Id. at 790. The master's responsibility is purely by
reason of his contractual relationship with the employee. Id Foster implicitly distin-
guishes between obligations imposed under article 2320 and those under article 2324
by reason of a joint tort-feasor's participation in a wrongful act. LA. CiV. CODE art.
2320 provides in pertinent part that "[m]asters and employers are answerable for the
damages occasioned by their servants . . .in the exercise of the functions in which
they are employed." (Emphasis added). By contrast, article 2324 states: "He who causes
another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it
is answerable, in solido, with that person for the damage caused by such act."
19. 381 So. 2d at 791, citing Cline v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6
So. 851 (1889). The characterization, in theory, seems accurate. Imperfect solidarity
connotes solidary responsibility and not true solidarity since the debtors are not bound
for the same reasons or the same policy. J. SMITH, supra note 12, at 351.
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distinctions between perfect and imperfect solidarity were termed
"untenable""0 and were rejected." This comment examines the
historical foundations of the doctrine of solidarity, its treatment by
the Louisiana bench, and the application of the doctrine in non-
contractual instances, specifically contribution and indemnity prob-
lems among tort defendants.
The Origins of Solidarity
Roman Law
Roman law recognized solidarity22 in two forms: correality and
simple solidarity.2 The theoretical distinction between the two is
that a correal obligation arose from one cause, 4 while a simple
solidary obligation arose from plural causes, distinct to each obligor:
"In both cases there was only one subject, one thing due, but in cor-
reality there was also only one obligation, so that what ended it for
one ended it altogether, while in [simple] solidarity the obligations
were distinct, and what happened to one need not affect the
others." 5 Correality most often arose from contract and had to be
stipulated expressly," but the law imposed correal liability in some
instances."
20. Imperfect solidarity is a doctrine which appears to have no basis in legislation
but which has surfaced from time to time, often unexpectedly. 1973-1974 Term, supra
note 12, at 291-92. Invoking the doctrine in Foster would have been manifestly unjust.
The issue that the court found determinative was the jurisprudential policy that "suit
against one party [imperfectly bound] does not interrupt prescription as to the other."
381 So. 2d at 791. Since that quirk is the only difference between perfect and imperfect
solidarity, at least from the creditor's standpoint, the court's attempt to reach a fair
conclusion in Foster cannot be too harshly criticized.
21. 381 So. 2d at 791. Specifically, Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 213 La. 53, 34
So. 2d 373 (1948), was overruled.
22. The term "solidarity" is "a name coined from the Roman expression, in
solidum, which has no technical force, but is applied when it is wished to emphasize
the fact that a man is liable for the whole." W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK ON ROMAN
LAW 453 (2d ed. 1950). To avoid confusion, in the section on Roman law the authors
will use "solidarity" to refer to solidary obligations in general, "correality" to refer to
perfect solidarity, and "simple solidarity" to refer to imperfect solidarity.
23. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS § 298b, at 20 n.6 (6th ed. Esmein
1954, La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965); A. BROWN, SAVIGNY ON OBLIGATIONS § 15, at 26 (1872);
W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 452; L. MIRAVITE, HANDBOOK FOR ROMAN LAW 263
(1970); Comment, supra note 12, at 220.
24. But see J. WYLIE, SOLIDARITY AND CORREALITY 21 (1923): "We may with confi-
dence assert that anything in the nature of solidarity without unity of originating
cause was abhorrent to the civil law."
25. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 454.
26. Id. at 452; Comment, supra note 12, at 221. Savigny believed that correality
arose only from the will of parties to a transaction or from the indivisible nature of an
obligation. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 16, at 26.
27. Comment, supra note 12, at 221.
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Examples of correality included heirs charged by their testator
to discharge a legacy," debtors to a contract with the stipulatio,"9 co-
owners of a slave for the slave's delicts or contracts,3" the superior
and the inferior for the latter's delicts,31 and defendants cast in judg-
ment together.32 Simple solidarity originally had a delictual basis but
was later imposed by law on relationships created by contract.33 The
most common examples were the liability imposed on joint tort-
feasors,3 4 the personal duties incumbent on co-tutors and co-
mandataries," obligations arising from contracts with collateral re-
quirements,"6 and the liability of joint occupiers of a building from
which something fell and injured a passerby.37
Although the theoretical differences between correality and sim-
ple solidarity were not clear, the differences in effect were well-
defined."
The principal effects applied to both types of solidary obliga-
tions:0 1) The obligee could claim the whole of the debt from any
obligor; 2) Payment of the debt by one obligor extinguished the debt
28. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 17, at 28; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 453;
Comment, supra note 12, at 221 n.39.
29. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 17, at 28; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 452, 453.
The stipulatio, a verbal contract, was "the most solemn and formal of all the contracts
.... [and] was entered into by question and corresponding answer thereto, by the par-
ties, both being present at the same time .... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1268-69 (5th
ed. 1979).
30. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 453.
31. Id.
32. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 17, at 28.
33. Buckland asserts that simple solidarity was imposed in certain praetorian
delicts, such as metus (negligence), dolus (deceit), and the actio de rationibus distrahen-
dis (action against tutor for misuse of minor's funds). W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at
456. It was later imposed as the result of contract or quasi-contract, when persons in a
common undertaking breached a duty through common fault; e.g., co-tutors, co-manda-
taries, or perhaps co-negotiorum gestors. Idl See also A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 20,
at 33-34; J. MUIRHEAD, AN OUTLINE OF ROMAN LAW 195 (2d ed. 1947); Comment, supra
note 12, at 221. Savigny said that simple solidarity arose only passively, never among
creditors. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 20, at 33.
34. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 20, at 33; J. MUIRHEAD, supra note 33, at 195. See
note 33, supra.
35. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 20, at 35; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 456; J.
MUIRHEAD, supra note 33, at 195; Comment, supra note 12, at 222 n.49.
36. Such contracts included the emptio vendito (purchase and sale), locatio con-
ductio (letting out of things), commodatum (loan for use), and depositum (deposit). A.
BROWN, supra note 23, § 20, at 34.
37. J. MUIRHEAD, supra note 33, at 195.
38. Correality and simple solidarity are often defined in terms of their effects,
rather than ,by their essential qualities or theoretical bases. See text at notes 24-25,
supra.
39. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 18, at 28.
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for all."0 There were also some secondary effects, including those
which were the equivalent of payment: 1) Deposit of the sum owed
in court by one debtor benefitted all; 2) A dation by one applied to
all; 3) A novation as to one applied to all." Other secondary effects
were: 4) Release (acceptilatio) of one debtor released all; 5) The mak-
ing of a pact not to sue with one applied as if made with all;42 6)
Compromise of the debt by one benefitted all. 3
All of these secondary effects applied to correal obligations."
None applied to simple solidary obligations arising from joint delicts
or the breach of shared personal duties.45 The secondary effects
which were equivalents of payment applied to simple solidary obli-
gations arising from contracts with collateral obligations. 4 ' Extinc-
tion of a debt by compensation or confusion was always purely per-
sonal." Since there was only one obligation upon which to sue,"
bringing of suit (litis contestatio) against one correal debtor released
the others.4" Because simple solidary obligors were bound by distinct
obligations,"0 the litis contestatio on one obligation did not release
the obligors not sued.5 In early Roman law, the interruption of
prescription was purely personal to each obligor, but Justinian
decreed that prescription would be interrupted as to all correal
obligors when suit was filed against one.2
Correal debtors enjoyed no right of contribution;" but, because
40. The second principal effect did not apply when joint tort-feasors were con-
demned to pay a penalty, in addition to reparation, for their delict. Payment of repara-
tion by one would extinguish that debt, but each was liable for the penalty. A. BROWN,
supra note 23, § 20, at 33. See Comment, supra note 12, at 221.
41. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 18, at 29.
42. There is uncertainty over whether a pactum de non petendo with one obligor
was enforceable by other simple solidary obligors. Id at 30-31.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id at 29.
45. Id § 20, at 33-34.
46. Id at 34.
47. Id. § 18, at 29 & § 19, at 32.
48. L. MIRAVITE, supra note 23, at 263-64. See text at notes 24-25, supra.
49. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 19, at 31; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 453.
However, an enactment by Justinian in 531 A.D. removed this effect from correal obli-
gations. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 19, at 31; W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 453-54.
50. See text at notes 24-25, supra.
51. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 453-54.
52. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 19, at 32; Comment, supra note 12, at 220.
53. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 454; L. MIRAVITE, supra note 23, at 264; Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 222. However, there is evidence of controversy among com-
mentators. Savigny admitted that the strict nature of correality would not allow
contribution but offered three justifications for granting the right to co-obligors: 1)
Correality is exceptional and unnatural; 2) Disallowing contribution would violate the
maxim, "One should not enrich himself at the expense of others"; 3) Contribution does
1981]
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correality arose by contract or among persons whose relationship
predated the debt, debtors avoided the harsh results of the rule by
contractual provisions giving rise to contribution, such as suretyship
or partnership." Scholars agree that contribution existed among
simple solidary obligors,55 but some commentators believe that a
joint tort-feasor guilty of dolus58 could not obtain contribution, while
one who had acted merely with metus57 could recover from his ac-
complice."
The argument has been advanced that there is no logical basis
for the distinction between correal and simple solidary obligations."9
One scholar described the distinction as "an illogical relaxation,
gradually extended, expressing the idea that those who do wrong
ought not to be released from their obligation to compensate, except
by satisfaction."8 However, the distinction has persisted in legal
systems derived from Roman law, and the framework of solidarity
remains relatively unchanged.8
not interfere with the essential nature of correality (presumably, the additional protec-
tion afforded the creditor). A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 23, at 37. There are indepen-
dent rights upon which the remedy of contribution can be based. Both partnership and
mandate provide relationships which could serve as bases for contribution; Savigny
asserted that only contractual partnerships and mandates should justify contribution.
One Roman jurist believed that the actio negotiorum gestorum provided the true
ground for contribution, but Savigny rejected that theory, arguing that negotiorum
gestio presupposed both a third person with whom the gestor had no common interest
or privity and an owner who was ignorant of the gestor. Pointing out that the relation-
ship of correi was completely different, Savigny advanced the jus cedendatum ac-
tionum (assignment by the creditor of his claim against the other debtors) as the most
rational ground for contribution. Id. § 23, at 37-39. For a fuller explication of assign-
ment of claims and actions in Roman law, see F. MACKELDEY, HANDBOOK OF THE ROMAN
LAW § 364 (M. Dropsie trans. 1883).
54. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 454-55; Comment, supra note 12, at 222.
55. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 24, at 40-41; Comment, supra note 12, at 222.
56. A tortfeasor who acted with dolus can be described as having committed an
intentional tort. Dolus is equivalent to craft, deceit, or fraud. W. BUCKLAND, A
MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW § 97, at 252 & § 130, at 329 (1928).
57. Metus "may be roughly described as negligence, or with more apparent preci-
sion as failure, in any given relation, to observe the standard of conduct which the law
requires ...." Id. § 135, at 337.
58. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 24, at 40-41.
59. W. BUCKLAND, supra note 22, at 457. Buckland argued that the theoretical
basis "does not show why those who combined in a contract of stipulatio created only
one obligation, while those who combined in a wrong created more than one." Id.
60. Id.
61. German law recognizes an imperfect solidarity similar to the Roman simple
solidarity. A. BROWN, supra note 23, § 27, at 48. Scholars have argued that imperfect
solidarity exists in French law. See text at notes 92-94, infra. The doctrine has been
mentioned in Louisiana jurisprudence. See text at notes 162-67, infra. The notion of im-
perfect solidarity was rejected recently in Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La.
1980). See notes 13-21, supra, and accompanying text.
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French Law
The Louisiana Civil Code articles on solidarity are almost iden-
tical to those of the Code civil."2 Article 1200 of the Code civil
defines solidarity in terms of its principal effects; debtors are
solidarily liable "when they are bound, in connection with a same
thing, in such a way that each one of them may be held for the
whole and payment made by a single one releases the others as
against the creditor." 3 Commentators have advanced several theo-
ries to explain the effects of solidarity, the most acceptable being
the unity of object.' However, some commentators "found it conven-
ient to assume a special tacit mandate between co-debtors whereby
they represented one another."65 According to Planiol, the concept of
mandate became the dominant theory.66 He rejected the idea of im-
plied mandate, arguing that no basis exists for assuming a contract
between co-debtors, but he asserted that co-debtors can be con-
sidered reciprocal representatives by operation of law.67
Although Roman law created the institution of solidarity, there
are substantial differences between that early concept and the no-
tion of solidarity in French law. Roman correality was based on the
nature of the relationship existing between persons before they to-
gether entered into an obligation, while French mutual representa-
tion is derived from the existence of solidarity, ie., the fact that
both debtors are liable for the whole. 6 Planiol stated that the
Romans used solidarity only to determine the recourse open to one
co-debtor who paid the debt but that the French employ solidarity
to affect the relations between the co-debtors and the creditor. 9
62. 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF Lou-
ISIANA 2088-91 (1940).
63. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1200 (H. Cachard trans. 1930).
64. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 298b, at 20 n.6 (6th ed. Esmein
1954, La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965); 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 751, at 404. See
also J. WYLIE, supra note 24.
65. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 751, at 404.
66. "This idea of mandate, originally conceived by the commentators, found its
way into the jurisprudence little by little and has been finally adopted as the basis of
all recent decisions on the subject." Id. no. 752, at 404.
67. Id. no. 753, at 405. Aubry and Rau rejected representation as a theoretical
basis and contend that the idea did not appear in French jurisprudence until the seven-
teenth century. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 21 n.6. To refute
scholars who reject the theory of mutual representation on the ground that it has no
foundation in the ancient works, Planiol argued that a theoretical explanation can ap-
pear after the creation of the institution: "If the idea is in conformity with the conse-
quences, if it explains the solutions given by the positive law, why not accept it[?]" 2
M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 753, at 405.
68. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 755, at 406.
69. Id. However, the secondary effects produced by correality could have great
1981]
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The theoretical constructs, even the concept of reciprocal
representation implied by law, could not justify the application of
the secondary effects of solidarity in all instancs of solidary respon-
sibility. Scholars proposed a dual system similar to the cor-
reality/simple solidarity of Roman law, classifying solidarity as
perfect or imperfect."0 The principal effects of solidarity, by defini-
tion, apply to both categories of liability.7" Secondary effects flow
only from perfect solidarity; broadly stated, an action by or as to
one co-debtor applies to all co-debtors. The interruption of prescrip-
tion by filing a suit against one co-debtor interrupts prescription as
to all."2 Pothier explained that result by reasoning that the creditor's
claim is the same personal right against all co-debtors; the creditor
who pursues one co-debtor into court expends the whole of his
right.73 Another commentator stated that the interruption operates
with regard to one co-debtor as if he were the agent of the others,
since the creditor can demand the whole debt from any one.7" Put-
ting one co-debtor in default has the effect of putting all in default,"
and, if the thing owed the creditor is damaged, all are liable for the
value, even if only one co-debtor caused the damage." The Code civil
introduced a secondary effect unknown in Roman law: The demand
of interest made against one debtor causes interest to run against
all.77
Some secondary effects not found in the Code civil have been ad-
mitted by the jurisprudence. The operation of res judicata for or
against one solidary debtor may be pleaded by or against the others,
unless the judgment was obtained through an exception personal to
impact on the creditor; e.g., the release of one co-debtor deprived the creditor of
recourse against the others, who were also released. See text at notes 20-31, supra.
70. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 20; 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note
12, no. 777, at 417.
71. See FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1200 (J. Crabb trans. 1977).
72. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1206 (J. Crabb trans. 1977). This effect is extended by
article 2249 to include interruption of prescription as to all co-debtors by an admission
made by one. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 756, at 406.
73. 27 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISsIER, PRESCRIPTION as contained in G.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, XVIII TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 561 (4th
ed. 1924) in J. MAYDA, 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 276 (1972).
74. Id.
75. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 756, at 406. In Roman law, putting in default
had a purely personal effect. Id. no. 757, at 407 n.6.
76. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1205 (J. Crabb trans. 1977). However, only the debtor
at fault is liable for damages beyond the value of the thing. See also 2 M. PLANIOL,
supra note 12, no. 756, at 406 & no. 757, at 407.
77. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1207 (J. Crabb trans. 1977); 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note
12, no. 759, at 408.
78. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 760, at 408-09.
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that debtor or was the result of collusion between the litigants.
Also, an appeal from judgment by one co-debtor or a cassation at
the instance of one co-debtor benefits the others."9 The idea of
representation as the justification for the secondary effects has been
rejected by the jurisprudence in several instances.0
Imperfect solidarity was created as a matter of public policy to
protect certain interests" or to guarantee public safety." Imperfect
solidary liability has existed between joint tort-feasors,83 co-tenants
of a house in which a fire breaks out,8 ' the tutor and surviving
spouse who fail to inventory the property of the former community
for judgments rendered in favor of minor children," the widow who
remarries and her second husband for the improperly retained tu-
torship of minor children of the first marriage,86 signers of a bill of
exchange, 7 co-heirs," co-owners of goats for damage caused by the
79. Id. at 409. A cassation is the reversal of a lower court decision.
80. The Cour de cassation has held that creditor can appeal against debtors who
do not signify the judgment in their favor, although one co-debtor has signified, and
that an answer by one co-debtor does not always prevent a default judgment against
the others. Id. at n.8.
81. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 19.
82. This is the reason advanced by Laurent. Comment, supra note 12, at 226. The
author says that imperfect solidarity is imposed upon persons who usually are
strangers to each other; however, an examination of the examples of imperfect
solidarity, see text at notes 83-91, infra, reveals that this is rarely the case. More prop-
erly speaking, imperfect solidarity is imposed upon persons who did not expect to be
bound together as a result of their actions.
83. No explicit provision in the Code civil imposes solidary responsibility on joint
tort-feasors. However, scholars and the courts have created solidarity by analogizing
article 1382, which establishes liability for delicts and quasi-delicts and is similar to
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, to article 55 of the French Penal Code, which
prescribes solidary liability for co-criminals. Aubry and Rau approved the analogy in
the case of offenses, committed with intent, but posited a different basis for imperfect
solidarity in cases of quasi-offenses: "[W]e cannot justify extension of the notion of
obligation in solidum for the reparation of a simple quasi-offense except by the princi-
ple of identity of the obligation to repair the damage .... " 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU,
supra note 64, § 298b, at 25 n.15b. Planiol suggested that a counterpart of Penal Code
article 55 was inadvertently omitted from the Code civil. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12,
no. 901, at 504.
84. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1734 (J. Crabb trans. 1977). Planiol stated that solidar-
ity is no longer imposed in this case. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 777, at 417.
85. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1442 (J. Crabb trans. 1977); Comment, supra note 12, at
226-27 n.93. See also 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 19.
86. C. civ. art. 395 (as it appeared prior to Act of March 20, 1917). See 1 C. AUBRY
& C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 19; R. BEUDANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
VIII no. 850, at 632 (1936).
87. C. COM. art. 151.
88. R. BEUDANT, supra note 86.
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animals,89 incorporators,"0 and the owner and charterer of an airplane
for damage caused by the plane."
The distinction between the types of solidarity has been criticized
by commentators,9 2 and Planiol stated that it has succumbed in the
doctrine and jurisprudence." Conversely, Aubry and Rau strongly
defended the distinction:
The distinction we have made between solidary obligations
(oligatio correalis) and solidary responsibility (obligation in
solidum) was known in Roman law. . . All instances of obliga-
tions in solidum are instances of responsibility founded on fault,
a legal responsibility, foreign to any conventional preexisting
obligation .... And it is only because of this distinction of ideas
that it is possible, within the framework of our law, to add to
the principle of unity of object-idem debitum-of the solidary
obligation . . . the explanation of the so-called secondary effects
of the solidary obligation based on the concept of reciprocal rep-
resentation among solidary co-debtors .... But ... this explana-
tion is absent from all instances of obligations in solidum where
the right of the creditor to sue all co-debtors is merely founded
on the indivisibility of the injurious result produced by the com-
mon fault of all the co-debtors; no concept of representation in
their relations with the creditor, no concept of reciprocal man-
date could be artifically introduced into this juridical relation of
legal origin, which is completely foreign to any idea of warranty
of performance voluntarily given to the creditor .... The perfect
solidarity ... today merely corresponds to the idea of a conven-
tional warranty for the performance of an obligation . . ..
Other interpretations of French law on solidarity are relevant to
a consideration of solidary obligations in Louisiana. Article 1202 of
the Code civil, which corresponds to article 2093 of the Louisiana
89. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 19 n.42; R. Beudant, supra
note 86.
90. R. BEUDANT, supra note 86.
91. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 65, § 298b, at 19 n.4.
92. F. LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS XVII nos. 313-14, at 311-12
(1876). Planiol was particularly critical:
The distinction which was made is purely arbitrary and would have constituted an
innovation in relation to our juridical tradition .... [Ilts basis is false: it is not
from a mandate to contract the debt, that the secondary effects result, but rather
from a sort of community of interest which, once created, establishes the solidar-
ity between them; this kind of association of solidary co-debtors can exist no mat-
ter what the source of the debt.
2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 778, at 417.
93. 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note 12, no. 778, at 417.
94. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 20-21 n.6.
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Civil Code, provides that a solidary obligation cannot be presumed
and must be stipulated expressly. The second paragraph of that arti-
cle states that the general rule does not apply when solidarity "ex-
ists, as a matter of right, in consequence of a provision of the law.""5
French jurisprudence and doctrine hold that an express stipulation
is required only in cases of conventional solidarity, not legal solidar-
ity," while Louisiana courts have refused to find solidarity in the
absence of an express statutory declaration. 7
The French code article on contribution" parallels article 2103 of
the Louisiana Civil Code, as that article read prior to 1960,"9 and
engenders some problems because it speaks of obligations "con-
tracted" in solido. Some commentators believe that the specific
reference to conventional obligations precludes interpretation of the
article as extending the right of contribution to debtors bound soli-
darily by law.90 However, these scholars argue that contribution
should be allowed among joint tort-feasors to avoid the burden of
payment's falling on a particular debtor at the whim of the
creditor."' The two theories proffered to explain contribution are
the action of mandate and legal subrogation to the creditor's claim.9 2
Louisiana Law
Solidarity: More than Just Protection for the Creditor
The Louisiana Civil Code scheme of regulating relations be-
tween the creditor and the debtor and among the debtors them-
selves closely resembles French law. °3 Article 2091"°' identifies
95. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1202 (H. Cachard trans. 1930).
96. 1 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 64, § 298b, at 24; 2 M. PLANIOL, supra note
12, no. 901, at 504.
97. See text at notes 114-26, infra.
98. FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1213 (J. Crabb trans. 1977).
99. "The obligation contracted in solido towards the creditor, is of right divided
amongst the debtors, who, amongst themselves, are liable each only for his part and
portion." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103 (as it appeared prior to 1960 La. Acts, No. 30).
100. 2 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET L. BARDE, DES OBLIGATIONS as contained in G.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL no. 1305, at 390-91
(3d ed. 1907).
101. Id. no. 1304-05, at 389-91.
102. 2 M. PLANIOL, suprq note 12, no. 769, at 414. He stated that the theory of man-
date is proper only when the debtors obligated themselves in solido by voluntary act.
In other cases, contribution exists by virtue of the legal subrogation of paragraph
three of article 1251.
103. See note 62, supra.
104. "There is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors, when they are all
obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the
payment which is made by one of them, exonerates the others toward the creditor."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2091.
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solidary obligations by their principal effects,"' and the articles
following specify secondary characteristics of solidarity."'6 Although
solidarity is intended to be an added protection for the creditor,
allowing recovery of the whole debt from any one co-debtor, the sec-
ondary effects are often equally important to him in prosecuting his
claim. The debtors themselves may be as concerned as the creditor
with whether they are liable in solido, since defenses such as excep-
tions of prescription and improper venue and rights of contribution
may hinge on the issue of solidarity. The secondary effect with per-
haps the most import for both solidary debtors and their creditors,
which has engendered much litigation,"7 is contained in article 2097:
A suit against one debtor in solido interrupts prescription as to all.
Article 3552 provides that acknowledgment by one debtor has the
same effect.'
Other secondary characteristics may influence the positions of
parties on the issue of solidarity. Putting one debtor in default puts
all in default and shifts the risk of loss of the thing owed to the deb-
tors.1 0 Article 2161(3) has been interpreted as requiring solidarity
105. Commentators emphasize the importance of defining solidarity by its principal
effects. One author has emphasized that the "definition of solidary obligations consists
of three elements: multiple debtors; liability of each for the whole debt; and release of
all by one's payment. The logical import of this article [2091] is that any obligation con-
taining these three elements should be an obligation in solido." Note, The Non-
solidness of Solidarity, 34 LA. L. REV. 648, 648 (1974). See also Professor Johnson's
criticism of Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972), in The Work of the Lou-
isiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term- Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231, 235
(1974) [hereinafter cited as 1972-1973 Term].
106. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2092-107. One writer emphasized the importance of
distinguishing between principal and secondary effects: "These requisite elements of
solidarity [article 2091] should be distinguished from other characteristics described in
articles 2091 through 2107, which do not help to identify an obligation as solidary or
not, but rather determine the legal effects of solidarity." Note, supra note 105, at 649.
However, courts have considered whether the secondary effects of solidarity should
apply in a particular situation in deciding whether or not an obligation was solidary.
See text at notes 139-44, infra.
107. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980); Thomas v. W & W Clarklift,
Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979); Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350 (La.
1975); Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972); Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co.,
213 La. 54, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948); Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367 (1927); Gay &
Co. v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880); Jacobs v. Williams, 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845);
Allain v. Longer, 4 La. 151 (1832); Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960); Grigsby v. Morgan & Lindsey, 148 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933); Barnett v.
Sandford, 137 So. 566 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931)(interruption of prescription by suit
against or by acknowledgment by one solidary obligor).
108. "A citation served upon one debtor in solido, or his acknowledgment of the
debt, interrupts the prescription with regard to all the others and even their heirs."
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3552.
109. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2096:
If the thing due has perished, through the fault of one or more debtors in
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for legal subrogation to operate. ' The Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure allows the creditor to sue all solidary debtors in a parish of
proper venue for any one.1 " Contribution among solidary obligors is
provided by article 2103,"2 although application of the article to
obligors bound solidarily by law, e.g., joint tort-feasors, has been ac-
complished only recently."
solido, or while he or they delayed to deliver it, the other codebtors are not
discharged from the obligation of paying the value of the thing, but the latter are
not liable for damages.
The creditor can claim damages only from the debtors by whose fault the thing
was lost, and from those who delayed to deliver it.
110. "Subrogation takes place of right: . . . 3. For the benefit of him who, being
bound with others, or for others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest in
discharging it." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2161(3). See, e.g., Pringle-Associated Mortgage
Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 741, 226 So. 2d 502, 515 (1969): "Clearly this language ['be-
ing bound with others'] presupposes the existence of a solidary obligation."
111. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 73:
An action against joint or solidary obligors may be brought in any parish of
proper venue, under Article 42, as to any obligor who is made a defendant.
If the action against this defendant is compromised prior to judgment, or
.dismissed after a trial on the merits, the venue shall remain proper as to the
other defendants, unless the joinder was made for the sole purpose of establishing
venue as to the other defendants.
112. When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obligation arises
from a contract, a quasi-contract, an offense, or a quasi-offense, the debt shall be
divided between them. If the obligation arises from a contract or quasi-contract,
each debtor is liable for his virile portion. If the obligation arises from an offense
or quasi-offense, it shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault.
A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may
seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making
him a third party defendant in the suit,. as provided in Article [sic] 1111 through
1116 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not the third party defendant
was sued by the plaintiff initially, and whether the defendant seeking to enforce
contribution if he is cast admits or denies liability on the obligation sued upon by
the plaintiff.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103. This section was amended by Act 431 of 1979 to encompass
the legislature's adoption of comparative negligence.
113. Article 2103 originally read: "The obligation contracted in solido towards the
creditor, is of right divided amongst the debtors, who, amongst themselves, are liable
each only for his part and portion." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103 (as it appeared prior to
1960 La. Acts, No. 30 § 1) (emphasis added). The courts held that no right of contribu-
tion existed among joint tort-feasors, whose solidarity arose by law, because the article
spoke only of obligations "contracted" in solido. Sincer v. Bell, 47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So.
755 (1895). However, contribution was enforced if joint tort-feasors were cast in the
same judgment. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933). The Quatray court
questioned past construction of article 2103:
It is true that the article refers to an obligation contracted in solido; but the rules
relating to obligations in solido, or joint obligations, are the same with regard to
obligations arising ex delicto as with regard to obligations arising ex contractu,
especially when they are fixed by judicial decree.
178 La. at 301, 151 So. at 212.
The legislature apparently attempted to provide rights of contribution to all solidary
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No Presumptions in the Law
Article 2093, contained in the section "Of the Rules Which
Govern Obligations with Respect to Debtors in Solido," appears to
be central to the determination of whether an obligation is in solido
but has never been construed consistently by the courts. Article
2093 reads:
An obligation in solido is not presumed; it must be expressly
stipulated.
This rule ceases to prevail only in cases where an obligation
in solido takes place of right by virtue of some provisions of the
law. 114
The text states clearly that a contractual obligation in solido must
be stipulated expressly; what has not been clear is whether a soli-
dary obligation arising by law, e.g., the solidary responsibility of the
employer and employee in Foster"'5 and Thomas," ' must be stipu-
lated expressly in some provision of law." 7 Solidarity has been found
in a number of cases in which it is not expressly provided in any
law, "' 8 but the courts have addressed directly the meaning of article
obligors by enacting what now comprise articles 1111 through 1116 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure. f954 La. Acts, No. 433. The attempt was circumvented by the
decision in Kahn v. Urania Lumber Co., 103 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958), holding
that the legislature evinced no intent to change the substantive law by enacting a pro-
cedural statute. The legislature was finally successful in granting rights of contribution
by passing Act 30 of 1960 which amended article 2103 to read as follows:
When two or more debtors are liable in solido, whether the obligation arises
from a contract, a quasi contract, an offense, or a quasi offense, it should be divided
between them. As between the solidary debtors, each is liable only for his virile
portion.
A defendant who is sued on an obligation which, if it exists, is solidary may
seek to enforce contribution, if he is cast, against his solidary co-debtor by making
him a third party defendant in the suit, as provided in Article [sic] 1111 through 1116
of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether or not the third party. defendant was
sued by the plaintiff initially, and whether the defendant seeking to enforce con-
tribution if he is cast admits or denies liability on the obligation sued on by the
plaintiff.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103 (as it appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts, No. 431).
114. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2093.
115. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
116. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
117. The problem does not arise in the case of joint tort-feasors, since article 2324
of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that joint tort-feasors are liable in solido. For a
discussion of what persons properly can be said to be joint tort-feasors, see text at
notes 178-97, infra.
118. The employee-tortfeasor and his employer have been held to be solidarily
liable to the injured party, the most recent case being Foster. Article 2320, while pro-
viding that "masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by
their servants and overseers" nowhere mentions that the "answerability" is solidary
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2093 in only a few cases. In Cline v. Crescent City Railroad Company,
the supreme court held that the railroad and the City of New
Orleans could be liable in solido for death caused by their
employees' failure to correct a dangerous condition on the tracks.
Speaking of liability under articles 2317 and 2320, the court said:
"All of these obligations have been recognized as being solidary in
effect, though not so stipulated";2 ' thus, the court refuted the defen-
dants' contentions that the parties could not be solidarily bound
under the requirement of article 2093. Later, in Cox v. Shreveport
Packing Company,"' the supreme court held that the employer and
employee-tortfeasor were not solidarily bound, basing the decision in
part on the fact that no provision of law declares that the liability of
the master is in solido with the servant. Cox was overruled by
Foster,'22 which, though not discussing article 2093, may have re-
jected that portion of the reasoning of Cox which held that solidary
responsibility in non-contractual situations had to be provided
specifically in some provision of law. The most recent mention of ar-
ticle 2093 in connection with the responsibility of persons bound
solidarily by law occurred in Wooten v. Wimberly.'3 The court inter-
with the employee-tortfeasor. Likewise, the supreme court in Thomas found that the
employer could be solidarily liable with the joint tort-feasor of his employee. While ar-
ticle 2324 provides for solidary liability of joint tort-feasors, the employer's respon-
sibility arises from article 2320. In Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d
246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), an insured and his insurance agency were held to be
solidarily obligated for the payment of the premiums to the insurance company. The
insured was liable by virtue of his contract to purchase insurance, and the insurance
agency was liable under its agency contract with the insurer, whereby it obligated
itself to pay premiums on behalf of the insured. It does not appear that either contract
contained a provision stipulating solidarity. The fathers of minor joint tort-feasors
were held liable in Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). The minors
were solidarily liable under article 2324, but the fathers' responsibility arose from arti-
cle 2318, which is silent on solidarity. The first circuit held that an injured employee
and the employer's workers' compensation insurer could be solidarily liable to the doc-
tor who treated the employee's injuries. The court said the employee was liable to the
doctor because of the medical services rendered, and the compensation insurer was
liable by reason of his agreement with the employer, of which the doctor was a third
party beneficiary. Again, no contract or provision of law expressly stipulated solidar-
ity. Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957). In
Bonacorso v. Turnley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957), the first circuit held that a
homeowner and purchaser could be solidarily liable to the real estate broker who ar-
ranged the sale, because each had obligated himself to pay the broker's commission,
although the obligation was created by separate acts and does not appear to have been
specified as solidary.
119. 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889).
120. 41 La. Ann. at 1039, 6 So. at 855.
121. 213 La. 54, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
122. 381 So. 2d at 791.
123. 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972). The meaning of article 2093 was considered in an
earlier case, Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960), but in connec-
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preted the first paragraph of article 2093 as requiring an express
stipulation of solidarity in contracts and laws and interpreted the
second paragraph as waiving the requirement that solidarity be stip-
ulated in writing when stipulated in a law.12 ' This creative interpre-
tation of the article has not met with approval,125 and the authors
submit that this construction cannot be sustained under the words
of the text.12
tion with the liability of the insurer and the insured for damages cause by the insured's
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Against the insured's protests that he and his
insurer were not solidarily liable because solidarity was not expressed by law or in the
insurance contract, the court said, "[iut is likewise well settled that where two debtors
are by contract each bound for the whole of the same debt, the legal effect of the in-
tention of the parties as manifested by the language and the terms of the agreement is
to create a solidary obligation, despite the failure of the parties to specifically
characterize their obligation as 'in solido."' Id. at 644. The court's decision was based
on the first paragraph of article 2093, applicable to conventional obligations, but,
arguably, the liberal approach to the seemingly stringent requirement of an express
stipulation in that paragraph would apply with greater force to paragraph two, which
provides situations in which the "rule ceases to prevail."
124. When Article 2093 declares that "an obligation in solidois not presumed" but
must be "expressly stipulated", this means that solidarity may not be presumed
in contracts or other writings or in laws creating obligations in solido. That part
of the rule which "ceases to prevail" when some "provision of law" creates the
solidarity refers to the requirement that the solidarity be "expressly stipulated"
in a contract or other writing. It does not mean that the rule that a solidary
obligation cannot be presumed is inapplicable to laws imposing the solidary obliga-
tion.
272 So. 2d at 305. Although the language of the court does not say that solidarity im-
posed by law must be "expressly stipulated," but only that it "may not be presumed,"
the wording of the article seems to indicate that solidarity is "presumed" (wrongly) if
it is not "expressly stipulated." Therefore, in saying that legal solidarity cannot be
presumed, the court must be saying that solidarity must be stipulated expressly.
125. Professor Johnson argues that persons liable for an entire debt, e.g., the
father and son for the son's torts, should be solidarily bound for the creditor's benefit,
so that he can compel any one of the solidary debtors to pay the entire debt. 1972-1973
Term, supra note 105, at 233. In criticizing the Wooten decision, Professor Johnson
wrote, "The majority opinion recognizes that both father and son are bound for the
same debt, either can be compelled for the whole and that payment by one exonerates
the other and presumably these characteristics result from some provisions of law, but
then it rejects solidarity." Id. at 235. A student, also writing on Wooten, stressed the
importance of identifying a solidary obligation on the basis of article 2091 and of not
confusing the determination with the application of the secondary effects. See Note,
supra note 105.
126. Note, supra note 105.
However, the court's interpretation of article 2093, as applicable to a situation
like the instant case where solidary liability is provided by law, seems inconsis-
tent with both grammatical construction and traditional interpretation. . . .Cer-
tainly an obvious construction of this article, if not the most apparent, is that the
entire rule of the first paragraph is inapplicable when solidarity results from pro-
vision of law rather than by contract, and that consequently no express stipula-
tion of solidarity is necessary in such cases.
Id. at 651-52. The plaintive question of Justice Miller expressed in Zeigler v. His
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An Elusive Existence
One decision that has not been made in Louisiana jurisprudence
is precisely how the existence of solidarity will be determined.
Despite the language of article 2093 and its proposed constructions,
courts have found obligations to be solidary in many instances in
which solidarity is not specified in a contract or statute."' z The
jurisprudence has developed two discernible methods for determin-
ing whether an obligation is solidary; the court may decide that an
obligation is solidary because all debtors are bound for the same
thing to the same creditor, who may collect the whole debt from any
one. This "principal effects" standard classifies an obligation as
solidary because it matches article 2091's definition of solidarity.28
Or, the court may decide that solidarity exists when its secondary
effects, e.g., the interruption of prescription" or the right of con-
tribution,"'0 apply to the parties.
Foster decided that the employee-tortfeasor and his employer
are solidarily liable because "both master and servant are none-
theless obligated for the same thing, repair of the damage to the
third party," and because article 2091 declares that the obligation is
in solido in such a situation."' In Thomas, the court decided that the
employer and his employee's concurrently negligent tortfeasor are
solidarily responsible because they are joint tort-feasors. 33 However,
Justice Dennis, in a concurring opinion, stressed his belief that
solidarity exists because the requirements of article 2091 are met. 3 '
Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 144, 21 So. 666 (1897), seems appropriate: "After all, on this
question, is not the Code itself enough?" 49 La. Ann. at 188, 21 So. at 684. However,
the authors' viewpoint is buttressed by the interpretations of article 1202 of the Code
civil, the French counterpart of article 2093. See notes at 95-97, supra, and accompany-
ing text.
127. See the representative cases collected in note 118, supra.
128. For the text of article 2091, see note 104, supra.
129. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097.
130. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
131. 381 So. 2d at 790-91.
132. 375 So. 2d at 378. Note the express reliance on Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La.
289, 151 So. 208 (1933) (holding that a party can be a joint tort-feasor even though his
liability arises only by virtue of the fact that he is answerable for another's
negligence).
133. "Either the employer or the employee can be made to satisfy the obligation,
therefore, the requirement of article 2091 that either obligor may be held to pay the
whole debt is met here." 375 So. 2d at 379 (Dennis, J., concurring). Justice Dennis
criticized the majority for failing to "confront" the holding of Cox that an employer
and employee cannot be solidarily liable because the Cox court felt that certain second-
ary effects (the interruption of prescription) could not be applied justly to the
employer. In light of the express rejection of Cox in the Foster case, it is arguable
that the supreme court has adopted a "principal effects" test, i.e., if the obligation
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In Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters,4 the first circuit held that
an injured employee and the employer's workers' compensation in-
surer were solidarily liable to a doctor who treated the employee
because they were both liable for the debt. In Granger v. General
Motors, the third circuit held that a negligent driver, the dealer, and
the manufacturer of an automobile could be solidarily liable to an in-
jured person for the sole reason that all could be made to pay the
damages awarded to the plaintiff.' s In another case, the supreme
court found that a building owner and subcontractor were solidarily
bound for wages owed laborers of the subcontractor, because the
subcontractor was liable by reason of his status as employer, and
the owner was liable under the privilege granted to laborers in the
Revised Statutes.8 The decision was reversed on rehearing, but the
court indicated that, given the proper circumstances, it might find
the parties solidarily bound. The courts long have held the maker
and endorsers of a note solidarily liable simply on the grounds that
each is liable for the whole amount of the note. 1"7
This practice of basing the existence of solidarity on whether
the creditor can recover the entire debt from one of the obligors has
been advocated by scholars 8' and appears to accord with the basic
notion of solidarity, that the creditor be provided with a greater
number of debtors from whom to collect.
An equally obvious trend of decisions, the most notable of which
meets the requirements of article 2091 (all debtors are obligated for the same thing
and each may be compelled to pay the whole debt), it will be termed solidary.
134. 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
135. Granger v. General Motors Corp., 171 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). The
decision may have been motivated by the equities of the case. The plaintiff had sued
and recovered judgment from the negligent driver, who paid the judgment. The plain-
tiff then brought suit against the dealer and the manufacturer of the negligent driver's
vehicle, alleging a breach of warranty. The defendants' exceptions of no cause of action
and of judicial estoppel were sustained by the district court and affirmed on appeal, on
the grounds that all defendants were solidary obligors and that payment of the judg-
ment by the driver extinguished the debt of all obligors. The court obviously felt that
it was unjust to allow the plaintiff to recover separate awards in separate suits against
the parties who were responsible, in some way, for the accident.
136. Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969)
(on original hearing). On rehearing the court reversed, holding that the contractor was
not liable to the laborers until the liens were filed, and thus, he and the subcontractor
could not be liable in solido. But, the decision indicated that the two parties would
have been held liable in solido, had the laborers filed their liens and provoked the con-
tractor's liability. The court made no mention of any reason for holding the parties
bound in solido, other than the fact that both were liable for the wages.
137. Allain v. Longer, 4 La. 151 (1832); Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367
(1927); Barnett v. Sandford, 137 So. 566 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
138. 1973-1974 Term, supra note 12, at 294.
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is Wooten,'39 is based on whether the secondary characteristics of
solidarity apply to parties in a particular relationship. In holding
that-a father and his minor son are not solidarily bound for payment
of damages occasioned by the latter's torts, the court stated that the
fact that both parties can be made to pay the entire debt is not
always sufficient to establish solidarity. The court stated that the
father and son were not solidarily responsible "because nothing in
the relationship enables the son to avail himself of the advantages
stipulated for co-debtors in solido by article 2104."' ° The court
reasoned: Solidary obligors are entitled to contribution from their
co-debtors under article 2103; the son cannot claim contribution from
his father; therefore, the two must not be bound in solido."' In
Cox, "'42 the court declined to find solidarity between the employer
and employee, although both were liable for damages caused by the
employee's negligence. The court stated that allowing a suit against
the employee to interrupt prescription as to the employer, who
"often has no knowledge of the wrong committed by the servant,"
would be "unjust and unfair." ' Clearly the court based its decision
against solidarity on the fact that the secondary effect of interrup-
ting prescription should not apply to the parties, rather than on the
fact that the principal effect of solidarity obtains.'
From a survey of judicial decisions, one may conclude that Lou-
isiana does not have an ordered doctrine of solidarity; few of the
decisions reveal an adequate theoretical foundation. One of the earli-
139. Wooten v. Wimberly 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1972).
140. "If one of the codebtors in solido pays the whole debt, he can claim from the
others no more than the part and portion of each." LA. CIv. CODE art. 2104(1).
141. 272 So. 2d at 307. The court followed its reasoning to the ultimate conclusion
that since the father is not solidarily bound with the son, he cannot claim contribution
from his son. However, the court suggested that the father might be subrogated to the
plaintiffs rights under article 2161(3) or some theory of indemnity or unjust enrich-
ment. Id. The court apparently failed to recognize that article 2161(3) requires solidar-
ity for subrogation to take place. Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La.
705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969); Commercial Ins. Agency v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974).
142. Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co. 213 La. 54, 34 So. 2d 373. The Cox case was over-,
ruled by Foster. See text at notes 13-21, supra.
143. 213 La. at 61, 34 So. 2d at 376.
144. Each of the joint tort-feasors possesses knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances attending the wrong committed; and when a suit to recover damages is
instituted against one of them before prescription has accrued, the others, by
reason of such knowledge, are in position to adequately protect themselves in
defense of the action even though cited after the expiration of the one year
prescriptive period.
There appears no justification . . . for applying . . . Article 3552 [interruption of
prescription], to the obligation of the master.
213 La. at 60, 34 So. 2d at 375.
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est decisions which attempted a doctrinal explanation of solidarity is
Union National Bank v. Legendre.'45 Legendre and Morris, book-
keeper and teller, respectively, at the bank, embezzled $15,000.
When the escapade was discovered, the bank demanded repayment.
Morris had died, and the sureties on his security bond paid $10,000
of the debt and were discharged. The bank later instituted suit
against Legendre and his sureties, alleging that Morris' sureties and
Legendre's sureties were liable in solido. Holding that the parties
were not liable in solido and affirming the trial court's sustaining of
an exception of no cause of action, the supreme court analyzed the
situation as "presenting three groups of solidary obligations for the
same object, but each having a different juridical cause." ' The
court said Legendre and his sureties were liable in solido, Morris
and his sureties were similarly bound, and Legendre and Morris
"perhaps" were solidarily liable as "co-trespassors."'4 7 Although each
was responsible for the whole debt, the court held that they were
not all liable inter sese because their obligations arose from dif-
ferent causes.
The question of whether prescription running against the en-
dorser of a note is interrupted by an acknowledgment in the form of
payment by the maker was considered in Jacobs v. Williams.4 ' The
court held that prescription was not interrupted, because the maker
and the endorser were not bound solidarily within the intention of the
Civil Code.'49 The court reasoned:
When ... several debtors bind themselves for the same debt, in
the same contract, they create among themselves a kind of part-
nership as regards that debt; they mutually charge each other
by a tacit, yet real proxy to pay it. . . .[It is easy to perceive
how different is the solidarity which exists between the drawer
and endorsers of a promissory note, and how inapplicable to
them are the provisions of our Code in relation to debtors in
solido."5 '
145. 35 La. Ann. 787 (La. 1883).
146. Id. at 793.
147. The court hesitated to characterize Legendre and Morris as liable in solido,
but as joint trespassers, the bank employees would clearly come within the ambit of
article 2324.
However, in the Code of 1825, the article was translated erroneously from the
French and read that the tortfeasors were "jointly" answerable.
148. 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845).
149. Later cases have held the maker and endorser to be solidarily liable. See, e.g.,
Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
150. 12 Rob. at 185. The court noted that "this indebtedness of each of them for
the whole debt creates, to be sure, a kind of imperfect solidarity between them, but it
is not that contemplated by the Code." Id. at 186. The reference to "imperfect solidar-
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The Cox court also attempted to find some theoretical basis,
such as the concept of a joint enterprise, for its decision that the
employer and employee were not liable in solido for the employee's
torts. The court spoke of the interruption of prescription as to
solidary debtors by the filing of a suit against one:
Each of the joint tort-feasors possesses knowledge of the facts
and circumstances attending the wrong committed; and when a
suit to recover damages is instituted against one of them before
prescription has accrued, the others, by reason of such know-
ledge, are in a position to adequately protect themselves in
defense of the action even though cited after the expiration of
the one year prescriptive period."'
The justices concluded that the master did not occupy this position
with regard to the employee-tortfeasor.
The Demise of Imperfect Solidarity
Imperfect solidarity, the only area of joint liability in which deci-
sions have been based on doctrinal reasoning, has been abrogated by
the Foster decision. 52 The doctrine was introduced into the
jurisprudence in 1880 in Gay v. Blanchard,53 which considered
whether suit against the endorser of a note interrupted prescription
as to the maker. Basing its comments on French works, the court
said:
Solidarity may be perfect or imperfect. It is perfect, and the
obligors are mandataries of each other, when by the same act, at
the same time, they bind themselves to the performance of the
same thing. It is imperfect (and they are not mandataries of each
other) when they bind themselves to the same thing by different
acts or at different times."'
ity" probably was not intended to adopt the class of "imperfect" solidary obligations
found in later cases, since the Jacobs court expressly stated that this type of solidarity
was not found in the Code. References to imperfect solidarity in later cases consider it
to be solidarity within the meaning of article 2091, but a type which does not carry
some effects of "perfect" solidarity. See text at notes 152-67, infra. Although the deci-
sion concerned contractual obligations, the court based its decision on a partnership, or
perhaps a mandate, theory.
151. 213 La. at 60, 34 So. 2d at 375.
152. "The solidarity is described as imperfect, when the parties are bound for the
same thing but not on the same basis, as in the case here of master and servant. ...
The distinction drawn between perfect and imperfect solidarity is untenable and must
be rejected." 381 So. 2d at 791.
153. 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880).
154. Id. at 502.
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The Civil Code provides no basis for imperfect solidarity,'55 and the
only difference between perfect and imperfect solidarity, other than
their modes of creation, is supposed to be that prescription is not in-
terupted as to all debtors when one is sued upon or acknowledges
the obligation.6 ' Therefore, in all cases other than those deciding a
prescription issue, any classification of an obligation as imperfect or
perfect is dictum.
The only significant case in which a finding of imperfect solidar-
ity determined the outcome was Jacobs v. Williams,"57 which held
that the maker and endorser of a note are not bound in perfect sol-
idarity; and it has not been followed.' Other cases have found the
following parties bound in imperfect solidarity: an insurance agency
and the insured for payment of premiums to the insurer;'59 the neg-
ligent driver, manufacturer, and seller of an automobile for damages
arising from an accident;' an employee and the workers' compensa-
tion insurer of the employer for medical services rendered to the
employee;' the owner and purchaser of property for the real estate
broker's commission;m ' and a railway company and city for injuries
caused by dangerous trackage under the jurisdiction of both.6 3 In
none of the cases would a finding of perfect solidarity have changed
the outcome.'
The relation of solidarity to the interruption of prescription was
155. The only arguable mention of imperfect solidarity occurred in articles 254 and
437 of the Civil Code. Article 254 was repealed in 1960. 1960 La. Acts, No. 30, § 2. The
article was translated from the French as imposing liability "in solidum" on the mother
and her second husband who retain the tutorship of the minor children of the first
marriage improperly. "In solidum" is commonly considered imperfect solidarity, and
the counterpart to article 254 in the Code civil was interpreted as giving rise to im-
perfect solidarity. See COMPILED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA (1942),
supra note 86; 1973-1974 Term, supra note 12, at 293-94 n.61.
156. 1973-1974 Term, supra note 12, at 293-94. See Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d
789, 791 (1980); Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1957).
157. 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845).
158. See cases at note 137, supra. The decision may have held that the debtors
were even bound solidarily. See note 150, supra.
159. Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
160. Granger v. General Motors Corp., 171 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
161. Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
162. Bonacorso v. Turnley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
163. Cline v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889).
164. Perhaps the courts' classification of the obligations in solido as imperfect
resulted from reluctance to adopt the absolute position that any obligation meeting
article 2091's requirements is perfectly solidary and should carry all the secondary ef-
fects of solidarity. Clearly the courts believed that perfect solidarity arose from the
same act or cause.
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considered specifically in Grigsby v. Morgan & Lindsey."5 The second
circuit held that the lessor and lessee of a store were bound in perfect
solidarity for injuries arising from the failure to keep the premises in a
safe condition. However, the court classified the defendants as joint
tort-feasors whose negligence was concurrent and whose duty arose
from the same act, the lease. By so classifying the parties, the court
brought the case within the ambit of Civil Code article 2324.66
Courts have held prescription to be interrupted as to solidary
obligors in other circumstances, but the decisions did not mention
the issue of perfect or imperfect solidarity.167
Had Louisiana followed a consistent doctrinal scheme in classify-
ing solidary obligations as solidary or not and as perfect or imper-
fect, the distinction abolished in Foster might have been warranted
to preserve doctrinal purity. As a practical matter, the distinction
would have been useful in some cases in which parties were bound
for the whole but were not bound so intimately that the interruption
of prescription by suit against one was justified.6 ' A logical system
would be one in which solidarity exists between persons individually
bound for the whole of the same debt when the law desires to ex-
tend added protection to the creditor. Such a rule would be
desirable in cases of joint tort-feasors or of persons bound by virtue
of articles 2317-20. Solidary obligations could then be classified as
perfect or imperfect according to whether the parties have a rela-
tionship sufficiently close to justify the application of secondary ef-
fects, such as the interruption of prescription. Lastly, rights of con-
tribution should not exist among solidary obligors merely because
the obligors are bound in solido, but might also rest on independent
rules. However, the state of the law does not appear to furnish a
means for untangling the jurisprudential confusion and for fashion-
ing a rational system with sound doctrinal underpinnings. The
courts must work with a jurisprudence that sometimes finds obliga-
tions solidary because all obligors are bound for the same thing, and
165. 148 So. 506 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
166. True joint tort-feasors are liable in perfect solidarity, by the express terms of
article 2324. However, the duty of the parties arose under different rules of law, that
of the lessor under articles 670 and 2322, and that of the lessee under the general pro-
visions of article 2315. Yet, the breach of duty consisted of the same act, the failure to
repair the building.
167. Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367 (1927); Allain v. Longer, 4 La. 151
(1832) (all holding that prescription interrupted as to makers and endorsers of note
when suit filed against or acknowledgment made by one); Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d
639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (prescription interrupted as to insured by filing suit
against insurer); Barnett v. Sandford, 137 So. 566 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
168. For example, the use of the doctrine of imperfect solidarity might have been
useful in Wootem. See 1973-1974 Term, supra note 12, at 294.
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at other times finds obligations not solidary because secondary char-
acteristics, such as contribution or the interruption of prescription,
do not, or should not, exist. And, with the demise of imperfect
solidarity, when an obligation is found to be solidary, the court must
apply to the parties all the effects enumerated in the Civil Code.
Another First Look at Solidarity in Louisiana Tort Law
Undoubtedly, both Thomas and Foster illustrate result-oriented
justice by permitting fair recourse to one wrongfully harmed. And the
relatively short prescriptive period for Louisiana tort actions'" has
encouraged the court to employ solidarity as a tool for preserving
plaintiffs' claims.17 But characterizing debtors as solidarily bound,
without limiting the effects of the label to those required to benefit the
creditor, portends serious consequences for future adjustment of
rights among obligors. More precisely, as rights between co-debtors
are defined by their relationship,17 whether the Thomas or Foster opin-
ions intend the incantation of solidarity to encompass debtor versus
debtor issues is uncertain. Furthermore, because confusion long has
reigned over Louisiana jurisprudence and doctrine 7 ' regarding the im-
position of solidarity, the proper application of Civil Code articles 2318'
169. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3536. See note 9, supra.
170. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097: "A suit brought against one of the debtors in solido
interrupts prescription with regard to all."
171. If the employer and the employee are truly solidarily liable for the wrongs
perpetrated by the employee, the Civil Code structures the adjustment of rights be-
tween the debtors in terms of contribution. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103;
Holloman, Contribution Between Tort-Feasors: Treatment By the Courts of Louisiana,
19 TUL. L. REV. 254, 263 (1944). This, however, is not the only plausible conclusion.
From the creditor's perspective, debtors may be solidarily liable, but among the
debtors one obligor may be liable for the whole. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2106.
172. Prior to Thomas and Foster, Judge Tate was at one and the same time an
erstwhile advocate of the principle, see, e.g., Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99
So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957); Bonacorso v. Turnley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1957), and an author of its eulogy. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d at 310 n.7
(1973) (Tate, J., concurring). Undeniably, however, Professor H. Alston Johnson has
been the writer most bemused by the idea and its Louisiana applications. See The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Obligations, 36 LA.
L. REV. 375 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1974-1975 Term]; 1973-1974 Term, supra note
12; 1972-1973 Term, supra note 105, at 231.
173. Despite the clear ruling in Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243
So. 2d 259 (1971), that a parent is liable for the tortious conduct of minor children
because article 2318 imposes responsibility and not because negligence is imputed,
intermediate appellate courts have persisted in their struggle with the question. See,
e.g., Lopez v. Buras, 321 So. 2d 792 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Lovett v. South Central
Bell Telephone Co., 308 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d
223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Scott v. Behrman, 273 So. 2d 661 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
Quite likely, the confusion stems from numerous older decisions which indicated that,
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and 2320,7 and the true principle of joint tort-feasors under article
2324,175 a recital that an employer is solidarily responsible with both
his employee 7 ' and a third party concurring in the employee's
negligence... is hardly surprising. Yet, the predictability of this
jurisprudential approach has not obviated the difficulties in attempt-
ing to make sense of the whole. An understanding of certain fun-
damental policies is essential to implementing the doctrine properly.
This section examines a few of the difficult problems that arise in
dealing with delictual and quasi-delictual obligations and solidarity,
particularly with respect to contribution and indemnity.
Express Solidarity-A Joint Tort-Feasor is a Joint Tort-Feasor
The only instance in the Civil Code chapter "Of Offenses and
Quasi Offenses" that specifies when obligors are bound in solido for
their acts is in the case of joint tort-feasors.'78 Unlike the general
common law notion of joint tort-feasors (including the situation of
two or more negligent entities concurring to injure another render-
ing joint and several liability for damages caused),'79 Louisiana's
rule, properly read, is considerably more narrow. Article 2324's text
evinces the redactors' intent with language couched in conspiratorial
in certain circumstances, imputing negligence from the tortfeasors to the entity statu-
torily responsible was correct. See, e.g., Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208
(1933); Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917); Bennett v. Employers Lia-
bility Assur. Corp., Ltd., 238 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Fontenot v. Pan
American Fire & Cas. Co., 209 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 460,
211 So. 2d 328 (1968); Hingle v. Ahten, 43 So. 2d 550 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950); Epps v.
Standard Supply & Hardware Co., 4 So. 2d 790 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941); Link v.
Shreveport R.R. Co., 153 So. 77 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
174. Like parental responsibility resulting from family relationship, the nature of
an employer's liability for the conduct of employees has often seemed mysterious. See,
e.g., Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977); Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483,
218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Cox
v. Shreveport Packing Co., 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948); Egan v. Hotel Grunewald
Co., Ltd., 129 La. 163, 55 So. 750 (1911); Caldwell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 271
So. 2d 363 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Dabbs, 194 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967); Little v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965);
Matsler v. Jones Motor Co., Inc., 128 So. 721 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930).
175. See notes 178-97, infra, and accompanying text.
176. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
177. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
178. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2324.
179. See Hall v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 692 (1956); W. PROSSER LAW OF
TORTS 305 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV.
413 (1937); Morgan, Workers' Compensation Third Party Suits: The Effect of
Employer Negligence on Third Party Rights, 41 LA. L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1980).
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terms'8°-assisting, encouraging, or jointly participating in the com-
mission of unlawful acts.18' By conniving together or acting in con-
cert according to a plan, joint tort-feasors are viewed statutorily as
either coaching or participating in the wrongful deed. Thus, perfect
solidarity of all culpable parties is not only logical but also socially
beneficial. As a matter of common sense, it is obvious that two
working together might occasion greater damage than one operating
alone; consequently, the law's sanctions represent the societal view
that, multiple party actions directed toward unlawful aims should be
deterred. Furthermore, society deems joint action in carrying out a
r wrongful mission reprehensible. The members of the group that
planned the scheme or aided in its execution are punished; the pun-
ishment is that each person who planned, assisted, or acted is liable
to the plaintiff-creditor for the full amount of the debt. This notion
of punishing wrongdoing not only favors the plaintiff-creditor, but
benefits society as a whole.'82
Additionally, the conclusion of perfect solidarity meshes with
the civilian concept that solidary obligors are mandataries of one
another."' By joining in the perpetration of the unlawful act, each
180. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324 with LA. R.S. 14:26 (1950 & Supp. 1977).
Louisiana courts have recognized this-idea, at least impliedly. See, e.g., Cogswell v.
Board of Levee Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 213 La. 817, 35 So. 2d 743 (1948);
Louisiana v. McIlhenny, 201 La. 78, 9 So. 2d 467 (1942); Huguet v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 196 La. 771, 200 So. 141 (1941); Rush v. Town of Farmerville,.156 La. 857,
101 So. 243 (1924); Kernan v. Humble, 51 La. Ann. 389, 25 So. 431 (1889); Irwin v.
Scribner, 15 La. Ann. 583 (1860); Wallace v. Miller, 15 La. Ann. 449 (1860); Smith v.
Berwick, 12 Rob. 20 (La. 1845); Irish v. Wright, 8 Rob. 428 (La. 1844); Miller v. Keating,
339 So. 2d 40 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), affd on other grounds, 349 So. 2d 265 (La. 1977);
Economy Carpet Mfrs. & Distrib., Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Baton Rouge, Inc.,
333 So. 2d 765 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 428 (La. 1976); Guilbeau v.
Guilbeau, 326 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1973).
181. A classic example is the holding of all persons participating in the tarring and
feathering of another to be joint tort-feasors and liable in solido. Newsom v. Starns,
142 So. 704 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932).
182. However, the blameworthiness rationale for the civilian idea of joint tort-
feasors cannot explain why two or more concurrently negligent persons are deemed
answerable in solido to a plaintiff incurring harms not attributable to either individual
defendant. Clearly, the concurrently negligent actors do not act in concert; rather,
mere chance joined the two debtors' substandard conduct.
183. See, e.g., Shield v. F. Johnson & Son Co., 132 La. 773, 61 So. 787 (1913); Cun-
ningham v. Penn Bridge Co., 131 La. 196, 59 So. 119 (1912); Dixon v. Gutnecht, 339 So.
2d 1285 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 673 (La. 1976); Abrego v. Tri-State
Transit Co., 22 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945). However, the mandate theory may
exist in name only; in practice Louisiana jurisprudence has found perfect solidarity
under circumstances in which mandate could not be assumed. See, e.g., Canal Bank &
Trust Co. v. Greco, 177 La. 507, 148 So. 693 (1933); Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113
So. 367 (1927); Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967);
[Vol. 41
COMMENT
person a party to its commission has admitted responsibility and has
tacitly consented to be held liable to repair the damage occasioned.
Viewed in this light, the imposition of solidarity under article 2324
is both conceptually sound and fair. Justice is obtained by present-
ing the harmed individual with a number of debtors against whom
he may proceed for the entire loss.
However, at some point in the jurisprudential evolution of Louis-
iana tort law, the lucid and cogent theory underlying article 2324
was obscured; common law reasoning perforated the Code's tidy con-
fines. As the prevalent problem posed (two or more negligent par-
ties concurring to damage another) is one which the common law
long has treated as one involving joint tort-feasors,'84 the improper
use of article 2324 is understandable, if unfortunate. Beyond the
theoretical constructs of solidarity, the effects of perfect solidarity
constitute tools sought by the courts in classifying debtors as joint
tort-feasors and, hence, bound for the benefit of the plaintiff-
creditor. Principally, the solidary effects judicially chosen to aid tort
plaintiffs include the rules that suit brought against one debtor
solidarily bound interrupts prescription as to all other solidary
obligors'85 and that each obligor liable in solido can be compelled to
pay the debt in full.' Consequently, courts may have looked initially
to the plaintiff-favoring qualities of solidarity in making classifica-
tions-regarding the conceptual underpinnings only as a matter of
secondary importance.
A simple automobile collision illustration may clarify the difficulty:
Driver A and driver B each fail to exercise reasonable care in
operating their vehicles and collide. The two automobiles crash into
C's building, located just off the roadway. The extent of the harm to
C's structure is a single hole in one wall. A Louisiana court hearing
suit brought by C against A and B probably would hold the two in-
advertent drivers to be responsibile in solido; quite possibly, A and
B would be referred to as "joint tort-feasors." While the determina-
tion of ultimate liability would be correct, neither the mention of sol-
idarity nor the joint tort-feasor nomenclature is really accurate.'87
Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960). In these situations, "the
court rarely refers to 'perfect' solidarity, only to solidarity, but it gives to these in-
stances of what ought to be 'imperfect' solidarity . . . effects which are the same as
those which would follow a conclusion of perfect solidarity." 1973-1974 Term, supra
note 12, at 295.
184. See note 180, supra.
185. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2097.
186. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
187. However, as of August 1, 1980, the classification of A and B as solidary
obligors is correct under amended article 2324. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, amending LA.
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Certainly A and B are not the conspiratorial-type of obligors por-
trayed by article 2324. However, both have caused damage to C by
their fault and they are obliged to repair it.'88 Because each debtor is
bound for a separate act of negligence, the rationale for each obliga-
tion is not identical; hence, the debtors are not truly solidary
obligors.'89 Still, C may compel full compensation from either A or B,
since the damage caused is indivisible."' The reason that both debt-
ors are bound to repair all of C's injury is that allocating delictual
responsibility by attributing shares to A and B is impossible.'91 A
more satisfactory approach resolves this problem by identifying the
nature of the obligation from the obligee's perspective, avoiding ter-
minology that colors unnecessarily the rights among the debtors.'
Notwithstanding this proposed analysis, Louisiana courts will
continue to label concurrently negligent persons causing a single in-
divisible harm as "solidary obligors." Act 431 of 1979 insures the
validity of this statement by amending article 2324 to hold persons
whose concurring fault causes harm to another liable as debtors in
solido9 3 Nothing is inherently wrong with such a classification; the
common law has managed well with it. But, it is essential to the
maintenance of a cohesive system under the Civil Code that solidar-
ity is recognized as something other than a passkey. One of the
Civ. CODE art. 2324. See notes 350-53, infra, and accompanying text. Properly viewed,
though, A and B are not joint tort-feasors even in light of the changes wrought by Act
431 of 1979.
188. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.
189. Professor Stone has expressed the view that the concurrent negligence of two
tortfeasors, culminating in a single damage or harm to another, does not produce
solidarity. Although, if the injury sustained by the victim cannot be separately at-
tributable to the concurrently negligent defendants, each is liable for the whole, the
concurrent action is not an example of solidary responsibility. F. STONE, TORT Doc-
TRINE § 113 in 12 LOuISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 157 (1977).
190. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2109: "The obligation is indivisible, though the thing or the
fact which is the object of it, be by its nature divisible, if the light, in which it is con-
sidered in the obligation, does not admit of its being partially executed." See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 2113.
191. The tort victim has but one injury. Once the damage has been repaired or
compensated, the rights arising among the debtors is of no moment to the creditor.
Thus, the courts have called A and B solidary obligors to permit the tort plaintiff-
creditor to take and execute judgment against any one debtor. A more thoughtful ap-
proach might have been to recognize the practical indivisibility of the debt; the iden-
tical desirable end would have been achieved. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2113.
192. The Civil Code is clear in acknowledging only two kinds of intra-debtor rela-
tionships. One calls for contribution. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103. The other provides in-
demnity. LA. CIv. CODE 2106. With the limited flexibility allowed by the Civil Code, ac-
curate characterization of the obligors' relationships is extremely important when
speaking of solidarity for the creditor's benefit.
193. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 2324. See notes 348-52,
infra, and accompanying text.
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essential tenets of perfect solidarity is that it must be stipulated ex-
pressly. 19 The mere fact that courts have ruled that debtors in cer-
tain circumstances are solidarily bound though not joint tort-fea-
sors"' further indicates that the term "solidarity," in the context of
the short Civil Code chapter'" of delictually based obligations, may
have several meanings.'97 The invocation of the rules of solidarity
based upon contractual relationship necessitates examination of
some of those meanings.
Relational Answerability- Whys and Wherefores and a Reason for
Article 2320
The Louisiana Civil Code provides a clear basis for holding an
employer financially responsible for his employees' tortious acts if
194. See notes 117-26, supra, and accompanying text.
195. The Foster court carefully pointed out that an employer and his employee,
while solidarily liable, are not joint tort-feasors. 381 So. 2d at 791.
196. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2315-24.
197. From an exigetical perspective, Civil Code article 2091 originates the concept:
Itlhere is an obligation in solido on the part of the debtors when they are all obliged
to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when the
payment which is made by one of them exonerates the others toward the creditor.
This definition has been described as consisting of "three elements: multiple debtors;
liability of each for the whole debt; and release of all by one's payment." Note, supra
note 105, at 648. But, in addition, article 2093 provides that solidarity is not presumed;
it must be stipulated or imposed by law.
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2315 through 2324 govern the principles of imposing
delictual and quasi-delictual obligations. A tortfeasor is liable for the damage he has
done through his fault. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315. Arising from a fact, wrongful conduct,
the obligation is imposed by law. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1760 & 2292. But of the tort ar-
ticles only article 2324 mentions solidarity. Naturally, courts, in an effort to aid plain-
tiffs, have applied article 2324 expansively. The concurrently negligent tortfeasors il-
lustration dramatizes the problem. Given that a single hurt is occasioned upon a vic-
tim, solidarity is not the correct tool to favor the plaintiff. The debtors are obliged to
pay one and the same thing, but for different reasons. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2092.
Properly speaking, the obligation is one of imperfect solidarity. Yet, the courts have
seized upon article 2324 for purposes not intended nor consistent with its rationale.
This continued jamming of square pegs into round holes is unfortunate. What may be
desirable in the instant case often spells ominous consequences for the future. Prob-
ably Judge Tamm has best articulated the evils inherent in the "present case" judicial
method:
it is obvious that the gravamen of the exercise results in a long series of inconsis-
tent, conflicting and confusing opinions predicated not upon fixed principles, but
upon a subjective determination of what is best in a particular case, The evil in
the system is, of course, that as heresies have a habit of turning into newly
minted dogma, the individual subjective ruling becomes "case law" and is the
springboard from which the next ad hoc ruling springs, like Prometheus unbound ....
Each such legal exercise reduces the stability of principles to a whiter shade of
pale and reveals the void of logic at the core of such procedure.
Gichner v. Antonio Troiano Tile & Marble Co., 410 F.2d at 248 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Tamm,
J., dissenting).
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committed within the course and scope of the relationship. " But as
sure as is the existence of the employer's ultimate liability, the
redactors failed to enunciate its theoretical components. Arguments
can be marshalled that the master's answering capacity is a function
of the concept of imputed negligence'" or is purely statutory in
origin."' Descriptive phrases, however, are not helpful, as the terms
"vicarious responsibility" and "respondeat superior" lack substan-
tive meaning." 1 Answers, if they are to be found at all, will come
only after a close study of the underlying structure of Civil Code
relational liability.
At common law the employee's negligence is imputed to the
employer; the two are regarded as joint tort-feasors. 2 Since the
employer has engaged in the enterprise creating the risk to the tort
plaintiff, the law has demanded that the employer assume respon-
sibility for that which benefits his interests. Thus, the master
escapes liability when the damage was caused by the employee's en-
gaging in activities not for the employer's gain, i.e., beyond the
course and scope of the employee's duties. In the absence of a
statute requiring the employer to make amends, the imputation of
negligence served as a fault-finding mechanism.
By contrast, the -Louisiana Civil Code specifically notes the
employer's liability, eliminating the need to fictionalize the passage
of the servant's negligence to the employer. Although examples of
imputed negligence may be extracted from reported decisions,"3
they do not represent a correct application of governing law. In sev-
eral instances, opinions that appear to apply imputation are solely a
consequence of peculiar factual circumstances °'
198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320. See Comment, Master's Vicarious Liability for Torts
Under Article 2320-A Terminological "Tar Baby," 33 LA. L. REV. 110, 126 (1972).
199. See notes 204-09, infra, and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v.
Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So.
992 (1900); Brannan, Patterson & Holiday v. Hoel, 15 La. Ann. 308 (1860); LeBlanc v.
Roy Young, Inc., 308 So. 2d 443 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 240 (La.
1975); Johnson v. Dabbs, 194 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Little v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965); Comment, supra note 198.
201. The term respondeat superior is defined as meaning "let the master answer."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (5th ed. 1979).
202. W. PROSSER, supra note 179, at 311.
203. See, e.g., Egan v. Hotel Grunewald Co., Ltd., 129 La. 163, 55 So. 750 (1911).
204. For example, in Egan v. Hotel Grunewald Co., Ltd., 129 La. 163, 55 So. 750
(1911), an injured person instituted suit to recover damages from the hotel company
and from Charles Sicard, who at the time of the event complained of was in the hotel's
employ. 129 La. at 174, 55 So. at 754. The plaintiff's building was damaged by pile driv-
ing vibrations, Sicard's construction activities in renovating the hotel. Id. While the
court reasoned that "[tlhe hotel company and Mr. Sicard were joint tort-feasors....
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Even after potentially confusing cases are distinguished, certain
inferences of negligence imputation are difficult to explain. In
Polozola v. Garlock, Inc.2"' the supreme court used language which
indicated that imputation may be a viable notion."' The plaintiff, a
pipefitter, sustained injuries when a spume of liquid propylene oxide
struck his face as he repaired a valve flame.0 7 Principally at issue
was the construction of an indemnity agreement between Dow
Chemical Company and National Maintenance Corporation to "hold
harmless Dow, its agents, servants and employees from and against
any . . . claims against Dow [or] its agents, servants and
employees, 20 8 even when the losses of Dow employees resulted from
their own negligence. Interpreting the contract to provide an affirm-
ative answer, Justice Marcus wrote that "Dow, the corporation, can-
not . . . itself be negligent, except under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for the negligent acts of its agents, servants or employees
committed within the scope of their . . . employment." ' 9
The court's equating the doctrine of respondeat superior with an
imputation of negligence is incorrect. In all probability, the Polozola
court intended to do no more than to rule on the contract at issue
and not to reverse abruptly longstanding ideas respecting the rea-
son for the employer's answerability for his employees' tortious con-
duct. In this context, Polozola was rightly decided; apparently the
intent of the parties to the contract was to include employee
negligence, as well as corporate fault through executive officer deci-
sions, within the agreement's ambit.
While the imputation problem has retarded greatly close exam-
ination of the basis for employer responsibility, the issue finally ap-
pears settled, because Foster is unambiguous in stating that a
bound in solido," id., its language is not accurately read as imputing Sicard's
unreasonable conduct to the hotel company. Rather, a more plausible interpretation of
the statement in light of the case's factual surroundings is that the hotel company,
through its officers' decisions, can be called independently negligent in directing its
employee, Sicard, to engage in the hazardous activity. Id. By charting the methods for
performing the task, the hotel company's officers were directly involved in the crea-
tion of an unreasonable risk of harm. Sicard and the executive officers acted in con-
cert, assisting each other in the acts resulting in the plaintiffs damage. Fully
developed, Egan seems to represent an application of article 2324 and not of article
2320. The theory of joint tort-feasorship and its companion, solidarity, was properly ap-
plied; in addition, the result does not illustrate imputed negligence principles.
205. 343 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1977).
206. Id. at 1003.
207. Id. at 1001.
208. Id. at 1002 (emphasis in original).
209. Id. at 1003 (emphasis added). The court ultimately construed the indemnity
agreement to conclude that the contract was intended to indemnify Dow employees
against losses resulting to them by reason of their own negligence.
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master and his servant are not joint tort-feasors ° The supreme
court adopted a view that necessarily rejects the imputation theory.
However, the rationale articulating why an employer is liable for
the servant's acts is disturbing; the basis of the master's liability is
significant, since article 2320 does not explain why the liability ex-
ists." ' Certainly policy plays a dramatic role. However, since identi-
fying the reason for the employer's liability may affect the rights
among the debtors, a probing analysis is desired.
At one time, the generally accepted view in Louisiana was that
negligence constituted the exclusive definition of fault;21 thus, many
older decisions attempted to construct and invoke an imputed neg-
ligence formula. The "[flault .. .is negligence .... [and] [niegligence
is .. .fault" 1' view underwent a dramatic change in the last decade
because of the supreme court's reassessment of obligations with
respect to ownership, ' relationship,25 or neighborhood. '  In
Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.2"7 the court ruled that the scope of
article 2315 is not limited to negligence 2 8 but that negligence simply
illustrates fault. 9 Following Langlois, the evolution of the legal
210. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 790 (La. 1980).
211. That article 2320 does not explain its rule is not surprising; articles 2317, 2318,
2321, and 2322 are similarly silent as to the social policy each summarizes. An argu-
ment can be made that the imprecision of the Civil Code's nine tort articles is what
was desired by the redactors, and is accepted by present legislative authority as a
codification of what is just and reasonable in each particular lawsuit. In this tort arena
judicial authority is at its highest. See Tate, The Law-Making Function of the Judge,
28 LA. L. REV. 211 (1968).
212. See, e.g., Helgason v. Hartford Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966);
Note, The Demise of the Latent Brake Defect Doctrine in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV.
847, 848 (1980).
213. This statement constituted part of Federal District Judge E. Gordon West's
jury charge in Khoder v. AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1976). As the action
was a diversity case, Louisiana law was applied.
214. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2317 & 2321.
215. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2318 & 2320.
216. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 667-69.
217. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971).
218. Negligence fault is defined in article 2316 which provides in part: "Every per-
son is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his
negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill."
219. "Article 2316 is not all-inclusive of fault, but rather illustrative of fault." 258
La. at 1078, 249 So. 2d at 136. The Langlois court found an alternative fault-finding
source in the standard of conduct mandated by Civil Code articles 667 through 669,
relative to a landowner's duties to neighbors. In violating the Code duty, the landowner
is at fault for damages caused, irrespective of negligence. One commentator has noted
that "Justice Barham viewed article 2316 as an illustrative, rather than definitive,
statement of fault. Accordingly, fault could be found in acts or events not involving ...
negligence. This expanded definition of fault gave rise to what must be termed strict
liability based on 'non-negligent fault' .... Note, Tort- Traffic Accidents- Theory of
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fault, or non-negligent fault, principle was swift. Holland v.
Buckley2 . held that article 2321 renders the owner of an animal
liable for damages caused, without regard to the owner's exercise of
due care, since negligence does not constitute an element of the
plaintiffs action.2 ' Shortly thereafter, Turner v. Bucher222 ruled that
the parent of a minor child is responsible under article 2318 for the
acts of a minor so youthful that he could not be negligent."' Suc-
cinctly, the court did not require negligence fault.224 The rapid
development of the legal fault principle culminated in the landmark
Loescher v. Parr... opinion. Former Justice Tate, as the court's
writer, stated that ownership of a thing that creates an unreason-
able risk of foreseeable injury is a relation imposing upon the owner
Strict Liability for Damages Caused by Defective Vehicle Again Rejected in Louis-
iana, 48 TUL. L. REV. 754, 758 (1974). In addition, Professor Yiannopoulos has termed
the Langlois opinion a position of "non-negligent liability." The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972 Term-Property, 33 LA. L. REv. 172, 183.(1973).
220. 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1974-1975 Term-Torts, 36 LA. L. REV. 400, 400 (1976).
221. When a domesticated animal harms another, the master of the animal is pre-
sumed to be at fault. The fault so provided is in the nature of strict liability, as an
exception to or in addition to any ground of recovery on the basis of negligence....
Article 2321 places the master of the animal under a legal obligation to keep his
animal under such guard that it does no damage to others. A fault in this obliga-
tion to control the animal and guard others from harm by it entitles the victim to
recover damages thereby sustained.
305 So. 2d at 119 (emphasis added).
222. 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975). See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1974-1975 Term-Torts, 36 LA. L. REV. 400, 401 (1976); Note, Tort-Damage Caused
by Minors Under the Age of Discretion-Strict Vicarious Liability Imposed on
Parents, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1194, 1200-01 (1975).
223. In Turner a woman was injured when struck from the rear by a six-year-old
boy maneuvering a bicycle on the sidewalk. Under the jurisprudence, a six-year-old is
incapable of negligence, as he is below the age of discernment. See, e.g., Jackson v.
Jones, 224 La. 403, 60 So. 2d 729 (1953). The court did not attempt to employ a notion
of imputed fault in finding liability. Rather, the majority reasoned that Civil Code arti-
cle 2318's "language is clear and unambiguous that it was the legislative intent to im-
pose a sort of strict liability upon parents as a responsibility flowing from parental
authority." 308 So. 2d at 273 (emphasis added). Simply, "[tihe fact that the conduct [of
the minor] was tortious when measured by normal standards is enough to render the
father liable therefor." Id. at 277 (emphasis added). It was of no consequence that the
child could not be obliged to repair the plaintiffs injury; as the minor was not at fault,
the parent was determined to be the sole obligor. Id.
224. Reinstating the holding of Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1885), the court
concluded that "if the act of a child would be delictual . . . the parent with whom he
resides is legally at fault and, therefore, liable for the damage occasioned by the child's
act." 308 So. 2d at 277 (emphasis added).
225. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975). For an excellent discussion of Loescher, see Note,
The "Discovery" of Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV. 234 (1976).
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liability for the damages caused by the defective article.2 6 Again,
the degree of care exercised by the owner is unimportant, since his
responsibility is an effect flowing from the relationship. 7
Since the master-servant relationship arises out of contract,"'
similar reasons exist for holding an employer responsible for the
employee's acts. 9 More than thirty years ago in Cox v. Shreveport
Packing Company,"' the state supreme court concluded that the
master's obligation under article 2320 was merely secondary when
he was not personally negligent.231 Perhaps even more helpful in
226. 324 So. 2d at 446. The court was of the opinion that Louisiana law was well
settled that article 2320 requires an employer to answer for his employee's tortious
acts despite the absence of personal negligence. Id., citing Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La.
34, 215 So. 2d 902 (1968). The policy reasons for the strict liability doctrine were
superbly articulated: The entity to whom the law recognizes the relationship to the
risk-creating person should bear the loss resulting from the occurrence of the risk. Id.
The law provides this mechanism for the benefit of the innocent person harmed-the
creditor. Therefore, in the interface of plaintiff-creditor vis-i-vis responsible relation
obligor:
The liability arises from his legal relationship to the person or thing whose con-
duct or defect creates an unreasonable risk of injury to others.
The fault of the person thus liable is based upon his failure to prevent the per-
son or thing for whom he is responsible from causing such reasonable risk of in-
jury to others.
Id. (emphasis added).
227. Justice Barham's Langlois opinion was predictive. In a footnote, he remarked
that the structure of the Civil Code, principally articles 2318 through 2322, indicates
that the imposition of liability for fault not premised upon negligence was within the
redactors' intendment. The duty to respond in damages is legislatively mandated as a
matter of social order "by reason of relationships." 258 La. at 1084 n.14, 249 So. 2d at
140 n.14. Former Justice Barham has long been fascinated with this concept. See
Barham, Liability Without Fault, 17 LA. B.J. 271 (1970). Other commentators have
made similar observations. See Verlander, We Are Responsible, 2 TUL. Civ. L.F. 1
(1974).
228. See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1948).
The answerability of the employer for damages caused by the servant, acting within
the scope of employment, is derived from this relationship. Loescher v. Parr, 324 So.
2d 441, 446 (La. 1975); Comment, The Employer's Indemnity Action, 34 LA. L. REV. 79,
81 (1973).
229. Liability is a by-product of the benefit which the employer enjoys from the
employee's engaging in activities which promote the business enterprise. Comment,
supra note 228, at 85.
230. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
231. The precise issue presented was whether Civil Code article 3552 (providing
that the acknowledgement of the debt by one obligor bound in solido interrupts
prescription as to all solidary debtors) was applicable in the master-servant context. In
a situation in which the employer was not independently at fault, the Cox court saw no
justification for applying article 3552 to the debt of the master for damages arising
from a tort committed by an employee. 213 La. at 60, 34 So. 2d at 375. Although subse-
quently criticized as a misinterpretation due in part to "the dearth of ... translated
doctrinal explanations," Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d at 308 (La. 1973) (Tate, J.,
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characterizing the reason for the master's liability is Justice Mc-
Caleb's statement, writing for the Williams v. Marionneaux32 major-
ity:
[T]he liability imposed on the master by Article 2320 of the code
in favor of third persons for the damages ... rests solely on the
principle of respondeat superior and is derivative or secondary
in all cases where the master himself is not at fault.133
On balance, it appears that the employer's fault, purely legal or
statutory in nature,3 ' functions in practice to provide the plaintiff-
creditor with an answerable entity.2" But the policy of providing the
plaintiff-creditor with a solvent obligor, even if accomplished by
classifying the debtors as solidarily bound, does not necessarily
mean that the rights among the debtors are thereby dictated. In
short, the Foster.3 . court's conclusion that the employer and
employee are solidary obligors vis-A-vis the plaintiff237 does not re-
quire that the legal categorization control the rights between the
debtors.238 The reason for each obligor's indebtedness must be re-
membered. When obligors are responsible to the creditor for dif-
ferent reasons, they may not be equally liable.2 39 Two old Louisiana
concurring), with regard to the solidarity issue, Cox has never been said to have erred
in identifying the employer's obligation as statutory in origin.
232. 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
233. 240 La. at 722-23, 124 So. 2d at 922, citing Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 213
La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948). The recognition of the employer's responsibility as Code-
based is correct; a finding of responsibility on any other basis is inaccurate, in the
absence of independent negligence. Comment, supra note 46. Furthermore, Williams
points out that "[uinder our law, unlike some common law states .... the master is not
considered a joint tortfeasor with his servant when his liability ... is based solely on
the doctrine of respondeat superior." 240 La. at 723, 124 So. 2d at 922, citing Costa v.
Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900); Brannan, Patterson & Holiday v. Hoel, 15 La.
Ann. 308 (1860).
234. See note 226, supra, and accompanying text.
235. In Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973), the Louisiana Supreme
Court, interpreting article 2318, noted that the father was "answerable" for the
minor's torts. Id. at 307.
236. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 790-91 (La. 1980).
237. Id.
238. While the fact that the employer and the employee are bound differently to do
the same thing does not determine whether their obligation is solidary after Foster v.
Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980), and Thomas v. W & W Clarklift Inc., 375 So. 2d
375 (La. 1979), it should be noted that when the debt is principally the concern of one
obligor, the normal effects of solidarity should not follow. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2106. Con-
tribution between debtors is not a necessary consequence of solidarity for the
creditor's favor.
239. See notes 276-99, infra, and accompanying text.
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decisions2 4° aid in developing the problem and in providing a solu-
tion.
In Sutton v. Champagne2" two youths242 were shooting birds
with a small caliber rifle within the New Orleans city limits. The
rifle and cartridges had been given to one of the boys by his father.
The friend of the boy with the dangerous weapon tried his aim, and
the unfortunate result was the mortal wounding of a third child. 43
The decedent's parents instituted suit. When the case reached the
supreme court, Justice Provosty, in announcing the court's view,
determined that the father who had provided his son with the risk-
creating instrument was liable.244 In addition, the mother2 41 of the
boy who wrongfully discharged the rifle was responsible.246 Clearly
the decision appears correct, and justice was served. But Sutton is
of much greater import. The father who had given the weapon to
the child was liable for two distinct reasons.2 47 However, the mother
240. Appalachian Corp., Inc. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922); Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917).
241. 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917).
242. Both boys were fourteen years old. 141 La. 470, 75 So. at 210.
243. Id.
244. The language the court used in its opinion is significant:
We have no difficulty in deducing the liability of defendant Champagne. He,
under the above quoted codal [sic] provision [Civil Code article 23181 is answerable
for the acts of his boy; hence the legal situation as to him is precisely as if he, and
not his boy, had handed this rifle to inexperienced young Sill .... Thereby he
assumed the risks incidental to the inexperience and unskillfulness of the boy in
handling this dangerous instrument.
141 La. at 472, 75 So. at 210.
245. Article 2318 provides that only after the decease of the father is the mother
responsible for her child's tortious conduct. Evidently, young Sill's father was deceased,
as the mother was held answerable. While article 2318's expression of proper family
order is better suited to a time long passed, the archaic wording rarely controls the deci-
sions. But when it has, such as in Gaspard v. LeMarie, 245 La. 239, 250, 158 So. 2d 149,
153 (1963), a question of constitutional dimension arises. Although far beyond the scope
of this comment, in light of the recent interest given to legislative classifications by
gender by the United States Supreme Court, such categorization is highly doubtful.
See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979);
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
246. 141 La. at 472-73, 75 So. at 211.
247. First, if his son's giving of the rifle to the Sill boy was an act that may be
characterized as quasi-delictual, tie., negligent, then Mr. Champagne was liable for the
reasonably foreseeable consequences, including the tragic incident, by virtue of article
2318. On the other hand, Mr. Champagne's act of giving a young boy a dangerous
weapon within the city limits might be said to be conduct so imprudent as to con-
stitute unreasonable or substandard behavior in and of itself. Certainly, it seems
foreseeable that a young boy might allow another inexperienced child to fire the rifle
with its sad consequences; hence, Mr. Champagne was under a duty to protect against
that very risk. Read in this light, the operative principles in Sutton are very similar to
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of the boy that occasioned the wrong was answerable solely because
of her relation with her son. Logically, the court provided her
recourse against the person who brought on the event, Mr. Cham-
pagne.248 Although the parental defendants were cast in judgment in
solido,..9 the court stated that "upon payment of ... [the] judgment,
or any part thereof, the said Mrs. Maggie Sill [shall] have judgment
• ..against the said Louis J. Champagne for whatever amount is
thus paid by her."25
At first blush, Sutton's analysis seems confounding. To benefit
the plaintiffs, the court held the defendants liable in solido.51 If the
court actually intended to characterize the debtors' relation as one
of solidarity, ostensibly intra-debtor contribution claims252 should
have been in the offing. Yet, the Sutton court specifically projected
that should Mrs. Sill have to pay the judgment in its entirety or
only in part, her right against Champagne would be in the nature of
indemnity. Assuming that the conclusion of solidarity was correct,"'
the majority's adjustment of rights between the debtors was com-
pletely sound. Mrs. Sill's obligation was a function of a technical,
statutory decree.54 On the other hand, Mr. Champagne was per-
sonally negligent in permitting his son to discharge a dangerous
weapon within the city limits of New Orleans,255 which was in viola-
tion of a local ordinance.5 ' Mrs. Sill was bound because she had a
the questions posed in Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979). One
defendant is liable as a result of his relationship with a negligent actor, while another
debtor must answer for his negligence, which concurred with another's negligence to
cause the harm: a minor in Sutton and an employee in Thomas. As was the case with
Mrs. Sill, the technically liable co-solidary obligor was ultimately granted an indemnity
right against the tortfeasor debtor; the same reasoning should apply to the Thomas
situation.
248. 141 La. at 473, 75 So. at 211.
249. Id.
250. Id. (emphasis added).
251. The effect that the court sought is obvious. As an aid to the plaintiffs in exe-
cuting the judgment, either debtor could be compelled to pay all of the award. LA. CIv.
CODE art. 2091.
252. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
253. This assumption obviates any differences among doctrinaires over the ques-
tion whether the proper classification of the obligation with respect to both debtors
was of imperfect solidarity.
254. The Sutton court may have greatly influenced by the factual circumstances of
the case. Weighing the relative blameworthiness of each debtor, the court manifested
a distaste for imposing any liability upon Mrs. Sill. Justice Provosty wrote that "[lit
seems illogical and hard that a mother should be liable in damages for the conse-
quences of the act of somebody else in intrusting a dangerous instrument to her inex-
perienced child out of her presence and without her knowledge." 141 La. at 472, 75 So.
at 210.
255. See note 247, supra.
256. 141 La. at 472, 75 So. at 210.
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parental relation with her negligent son; Mr. Champagne was obli-
gated since he was personally culpable. Thus, the two debtors were
liable for different reasons. But, for the plaintiff-creditor's benefit,
the desired end is to present the wronged individual with as many
debtors as possible, against each of whom full compensation may be
exacted; hence, the solidarity of Mrs. Sill and Mr. Champagne.257
Once the creditor has been satisfied and judgment paid, how-
ever, the policy for calling the debtors solidary obligors no longer
obtains. At that point, the technically or constructively liable obligor
who pays the creditor in full should be permitted to pursue indem-
nification from the tortfeasor-debtor.2 " A conclusion of solidarity for
the creditor's advantage should not alter the decision.259 Prior to
Foster6 the doctrine of imperfect solidarity might have been
employed to achieve the same end. But the indefinite state of the in
solidum doctrine, with its "now-you-see-it, now-you-don't" '' qualities,
precipitated its demise.2 ' All one is left with is "solidarity" that is a
refraction of literalism.
Appalachian Corporation, Inc. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Company,
Inc."'3 is the second significant Louisiana decision raising questions
similar to those addressed in Sutton. The Appalachian Corporation
brought an indemnity- action after it had paid the full amount of a
tort judgment in favor of George Lincoln. 64 The'trial court dismissed
257. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2091.
258. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2106.
259. 1972-1973 Term, supra note 105, at 234-35.
260. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
261. 1974-1975 Term, supra note 172, at 382.
262. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1980).
263. 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922).
264. Lincoln, a night watchman at a warehouse owned by the Applachian Corpora-
tion, was injured when an iron door on the premises fell on him. The building had been
purchased from the Brooklyn Cooperage Company only two days prior to the accident.
Basically, the Applachian Corporation alleged that the cooperage company was still in
possession of the building at the time of the incident and that Lincoln's injury was
proximately caused by the negligence of the superintendent of the cooperage company
in opening and closing the defective door. 151 La. at 43-44, 91 So. at 540. In addition,
the Applachian Corporation claimed that Brooklyn Cooperage Company had actual
knowledge of the dangerous condition of the door and that the night watchman would
have to use it-an awareness which the plaintiff denied. Id. From the facts stated in
plaintiff's petition, two bases appear to explain why the cooperage company was at
fault. On the one hand, the negligence of the Brooklyn Cooperage Company's
superintendent and other employees in the course and scope of their duties should dic-
tate a finding of legal fault under article 2320. On the other hand, if the executive of-
ficers of the cooperage company knew of the longstanding defect in the door, the fault
may be phrased as more direct, even though a juridical person cannot actually be
negligent. See note 10, supra. Such direct fault, ie., negligence fault, is viewed both
judicially and as a matter of common sense as more culpable than technical respon-
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the case, sustaining the peremptory exception of no cause of
action."6 5 The supreme court stated that the principal argument in
support of the exception was that "one guilty of a fault which causes
injury . . .to another and who has been cast in damages for such in-
jury and has paid the same, can have no action for indemnity
against his co-adjutor in the wrongful act . . ,""' That statement,
like many rules of law, is certainly overbroad. Fault is not unidimen-
sional; rather, fault may be seen not only as different in degrees but
also different in kind."6 7 Reasoning that the plaintiff stated a cause of
action, the majority opined that the defendant's exception should
have been overruled."'
Articulating a legal structure for the appellate court's conclusion
is troublesome. Since the court was impressed with the notion that
the Appalachian Corporation was only constructively at fault, au-
thorization of an indemnity suit may have been grounded in causa-
tion principles; the plaintiffs constructive fault was not the prox-
imate cause of George Lincoln's injuries, but somehow the defen-
dant's fault, regardless of its nature,269 was.270 Perhaps a rationale
may more plausibly be gleaned from the recognition that the plain-
tiff previously had been held liable to Lincoln because of "some legal
duty.""1 In essence, the legal duty requiring the Appalachian Cor-
sibility. Notably, the Applachian Corporation court saw the liability of the Appalachian
Corporation (as it had been compelled to pay for Lincoln's damage) as merely technical
in nature- "predicated upon the duty which it owed of providing a safe place for Lin-
coln to perform his duty .... " 151 La. at 45, 91 So. at 541.
265. Under the modern Code of Civil Procedure, the exception is contained in arti-
cle 927.
266. 151 La. at 44, 91 So. at 540-41.
267. See notes 212-27, supra, and accompanying text.
268. 151 La. at 51, 91 So. at 543.
269. See note 264, supra.
270. 151 La. at 44, 91 So. at 540.
271. 151 La. at 46, 91 So. at 541. The court reasoned that Meunier v. Duperron, 3
Mart. (O.S.) 285 (La. 1814), was applicable. The facts of Meunier are bizarre but in-
structive. The plaintiff, a constable, had been put up to arresting a free Negro by the
defendant. Subsequently, charges were brought against the constable for false arrest
and he was fined, imprisoned, and compelled to pay severe damages. Having endured
imprisonment, and following payment of fines and compensation, he instituted suit
against the person whose word had caused the arrest. The court sustained a demurrer
denying recovery chiefly on the ground that what the plaintiff had done was a crime.
After he had been found guilty and punished, the law would not countenance the
throwing of the burden of his punishment to another. But the Meunier court indicated
that if the constable had been subjected only to civil sanctions, his lawsuit might have
been permitted. Id. at 287. Consequently, the Appalachian Corporation opinion notes:
The Appalachian Corporation was, in a civil suit, held liable and compelled to pay
damages for an injury caused, not by any crime or criminal negligence on its part,
independently of or in combination with defendant, but because of the ownership
of the building and its legal duty to keep the building in safe condition.
151 La. at 47, 91 So. at 542.
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poration to answer was statutory in origin and not a debt flowing
from a failure to maintain a certain standard of care in its conduct.
The real, tortious fault appears to have been on the cooperage com-
pany's side, 72 as its executive officers may have been the ultimate
wrongdoers."'
Sutton and Appalachian Corporation represent difficult cases,
presenting questions that courts grapple with even today. An effort
was made in each instance to strike a sort of rough justice. In doing
so, the Sutton and Appalachian Corporation decisions are invaluable
as teaching aids; the lesson is that a conclusion that debtors are
solidarily bound for the creditor's benefit does not itself control the
characterization of rights among the debtors. Deceptively simple,
272. One bothersome point is in the manner in which the court phrased the source
of the cooperage company's liability. The court found that Lincoln's injury "was due
primarily . . . to the negligence of the employees of the defendant acting within the
scope of their employment. ... 151 La. at 50, 91 So. at 543. With all deference, the
court could not have meant what it wrote. As the Appalachian Corporation instituted
its action for the full amount paid to Lincoln, the claim sounded in indemnity. To main-
tain the plaintiffs cause of action, the court necessarily ruled that indemnification of
the plaintiff was permissible. For that to follow in light of the approving reference to
Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La. 469, 75 So. 209 (1917), the plaintiff's technical fault had
to be outweighed substantially by actual negligence or greater fault. Yet, if the sole
source of the cooperage company's liability was that its employees had been negligent
in the performance of their duties, constructive fault squarely would have met
technical liability.
From a close study of the case and in view of the citations to Sutton as direct
authority, it is submitted that the Appalachian Corporation court impliedly found the
cooperage company "negligent." See note 264, supra. As between Appalachian Cor-
poration and Brooklyn Cooperage, the cooperage company was the party more at fault
if its executive officers knew of the dangerous condition of the door that injured Lin-
coln but took no corrective measures. But at least one other interpretation of Ap-
palachian Corporation is possible. Assuming that the cooperage company was responsi-
ble solely because of its employees' negligent conduct, both the plaintiff and the defen-
dant were only "technically" answerable for Lincoln's damages if the negligence of the
cooperage company's employees was causative of Lincoln's accident. However,
Brooklyn Cooperage was in a position to pursue an action in indemnity against its
employees for any amount it paid for their wrongs. At that time, the Appalachian Cor-
poration was not in an analogous circumstance. Its responsibility flowed from its
ownership of the warehouse, carrying with it a duty to provide Lincoln with a safe
workplace. The building can hardly be said to be a tortfeasor, nor is it subject to suit
by its owner to recover what the owner has paid on a judgment to another injured
because of some dangerous condition of the structure. Brooklyn Cooperage's employees
on the other hand were, ostensibly, tortfeasors and the cooperage company could main-
tain an indemnity suit. Hence, if what the Appalachian Corporation court was seeking
to do was to shift the debt in full to those actually to blame or truly at fault, permit-
ting plaintiff to proceed in indemnity against the cooperage company facilitated that
policy-even if the cooperage company was answerable only as a consequence of the
dictates of article 2320.
273. 151 La. at 50, 91 So. at 543. See note 272, supra.
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the notion is amply supported in the Civil Code... and is heartily en-
dorsed by commentators."'
And Now for Contribution or Indemnity
Perhaps the most available indemnity remedy in the tort con-
text is the employer's action against his employee. In common law
jurisdictions, the general view is that the master has a right to
indemnity from the tortious servant for payments made to third par-
ties, provided the master is without personal fault."' In short, the
"right to indemnity stands upon the principle that everyone is
responsible for his own negligence .. . 27 While Civil Code article
2320 is clear in holding masters liable for the torts of their servants,
the article has no provision for indemnification." 8 Yet, Louisiana
jurisprudence, unconcerned by the absence of a statutory basis, has
sanctioned the employer's reimbursement suit. 9
Indemnity principles are not limited to the employer-employee
relationship but extend to the parent-child circumstance addressed
in article 2318.80 Since solidarity of debtors is a legal device for the
creditor's benefit, the relegation of rights among the obligors after
the creditor has recovered his due in full is of no concern to the
274. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2106.
275. See 1974-1975 Term, supra note 172; 1973-74 Term, supra note 12; 1972-1973
Term, supra note 105. See also Note, supra note 105; Note, Parent and Child Not
Bound in Solido for the Minor's Tort?, 19 Loy. L. REV. 758 (1973).
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401, comment (d) (1957); W. PROSSER,
supra note 179, at 311.
277. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y.
461, 468, 31 N.E. 987, 989 (1892).
278. Comment, supra note 228, at 83.
279. See, e.g., Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969); Williams v.
Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960); Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So.
992 (1900); Little v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1965).
280. Professor Johnson has previously noted that the relationships of parent and
child or employer and employee permit either member of the relationship to bear full
liability to the injured party; but justice acknowledges a recourse or reimbursement
by the "answerable" debtor from the real "tortfeasor." 1972-1973 Term, supra note
105, at 233 n.15.
As the answerable parent's suit against the minor child's estate rests on the same
theory as the master's indemnity action, the prescriptive period for both suits should
be identical. However, it is uncertain what the duration of that term is. The claim
seems to be in tort, and article 3536 states a one year period of prescription. See note
9, supra. Arguably the action is grounded in unjust enrichment principles. In Minyard
v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624, 205 So. 2d 422 (1968), the supreme court ruled
that Civil Code article 1965 or the civilian action de in rem verso authorizes an unjust
enrichment complaint in Louisiana. Under article 3544, the unjust enrichment action
prescribes in ten years.
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creditor. If the reason for categorizing the debtors as solidarily
bound is to insure that the creditor is satisfied, once one solidary
obligor has discharged the debt the need to assess why the debtors
were responsible arises. If the reasons are different, quite possibly
the obligation concerned only one of the obligors, in which case he
should be liable for the whole among the debtors."' Civil Code arti-
cle 2106, admittedly cryptic, envisions such a situation and is helpful
in working through the complex problems involved in allocating lia-
bility among debtors when solidarity has been imposed for the
creditor.
For example, borrowing factual references from Thomas v. W &
W Clarklift, Inc.," 2 the following hypothetical is illustrative of the
problems involved: X, Inc., a distribution company employing
drivers to haul its products, hired A. In the course and scope of his
driving duties, A failed to signal a left turn at an intersection.. and
crashed into a vehicle operated by B. At the time of the collision, B's
automobile was in the intersection because B failed to observe a
yield sign. Hence, the negligent acts of both A and B caused the
mishap. Additionally, the impetus of the two vehicles carried both
into a third, owned and operated by C, who was exercising all due
care. Subsequently, C instituted suit against X, Inc., A, and B 84 and
took a $5,000 judgment which was enforced singly against X, Inc.
281. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106 states: "If the affair for which the debt has been con-
tracted in solido, concern only one of the co-obligors in solido, that one is liable for the
whole debt towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only
as his securities."
282. 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
283. The left turn is a highly dangerous maneuver requiring the turning driver to
use great care. The proper signal must be given, LA. R.S. 32:319 (Supp. 1962), and
failure to do so is one instance in which courts are certain to look to the statutory
decree as defining the motorist's duty of care. See Comment, Liability in Left Turn
Collisions, 22 LA. L. REV. 466, 467 (1962). For extensive treatment of defining duty
through an analogy to legislative stipulations, see generally Johnson, Comparative
Negligence and the Duty/Risk Analysis, 40 LA. L. REV. 319 (1980); Malone, Rumina-
tions on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus American Beverage Company 30 LA. L. REV.
363 (1970); Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v.
Lundin and Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973); Comment, Entering the Door
Opened. An Evolution of Rights of Public Access to Governmental Deliberations in
Louisiana and a Plea for Realistic Remedies, 41 LA. L. REV. 192 (1980); Note, Abroga-
tions on Dixie Drive It Yourself versus American Beverage Company 30 LA. L. REV.
637 (1979).
284. The cumulation of these defendants would be permissible. See LA. CODE CIV.
P. arts. 463 & 647. However, as X, Inc., A, and B are all solidary obligors vis-a-vis C, C
may sue any one or a combination of two without the necessity of joining the others in
the suit. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 643. Of course, the incidental action of third party de-
mand is available for the debtor or debtors sued to join all obligors. LA. CODE Civ. P.
art. 1111. See note 5, supra.
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Under these circumstances, X, Inc. was required to answer for
the tortious acts of its employee, A, committed during the course of
normal duties because of article 2320. A and B were responsible for
C's indivisible harm285 caused by their concurrent negligence. Cer-
tainly, the reasons why each defendant-debtor could have been com-
pelled to repair C's damages are distinct and different: X, Inc. by
reason of its employment relation to A who was negligent in per-
forming his duties; A by virtue of his own negligence; and B because
of his personal negligence. However, to aid C in recovering for the
wrong done him, the law states that all three debtors are bound in
solido.286
But since X, Inc. has discharged the obligation for which all the
debtors were liable, the present concern is characterizing the rights
among the obligors. The proper view is to allow X, Inc. to receive in-
demnification from either A or B, following the theory that the debt
to C, a consequence of the intersectional accident, was principally
the affair of A and B. X, Inc.'s role in the incident is best seen as
security which the Civil Code, through article 2320, offers to C
should A and B prove unable to pay. Thus, X, Inc. should be able to
sue either A or B for "the principal, interest, and cost of judgment
rendered" '287 in favor of C.
As the employer's right to seek indemnity from B, the third party
concurrently negligent with A, may not be apparent, a fuller ex-
planation is in order. Louisiana law, as noted above,8 ' is well settled
that an employer has a right of full recompense from his employees
285. See notes 190-91, supra, and accompanying text.
286. See Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
287. Appalachian Corp., Inc. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 42, 91 So.
539, 540 (1922). X, Inc. may be viewed as subrogated, of right, to C's creditor position.
Civil Code article 2161(3) provides that subrogation takes place of right "[flor the bene-
fit of him, who being bound with others ... for the payment of the debt, had an inter-
est in discharging it." If one accepts the premise that X, Inc. should be seen primarily
as a security, which comports with the article 2106 authorization of an indemnity suit,
the French Civil Code is more specific in guaranteeing X, Inc. indemnification. French
Civil Code article 2029 states that "[a] surety who has paid the debt is subrogated to
all the rights which the creditor had against the debtor." In addition, French Civil
Code article 2028 provides:
A surety who has paid has his remedy against the principal debtor, whether
the security has been given with or without the knowledge of the debtor.
The remedy exists as well with regard to the principal as to the interests and
costs: nevertheless, the surety only has a claim for the expenses he has incurred,
since he has given notice to the principal debtor for the proceedings instituted.
He also has a claim for damages and interest, according to circumstances.
(Emphasis added).
288. See notes 276-79, supra, and accompanying text.
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for any damage award the employer is called upon to pay for the
employees' delictual acts. Complete reimbursement "in the event he
is required to pay damages to the injured party resulting from the
servant's negligence" '89 is the rule, so long as the employer was not
independently at fault or liable by reason other than article 2320. To
the extent which Foster9. has changed the categorization of the
employer and employee relationship as solidary obligors in the
creditor's eyes, the fundamental principles of the employer's indem-
nity claim have not been altered.29
Consequently, in the hypothetical situation involving X, Inc., A,
and B as debtors, once X, Inc. has paid C, the damaged party, the
amount awarded, X, Inc. may pursue a claim for full recovery from
A, its employee. Under existing law A and B are solidary obligors
for the creditor's benefit, each bound for their respective negligent
conduct. 92 Furthermore, solidarity aside, unless the separate neg-
ligent acts of A and B caused a harm that can be apportioned, A and
B are both bound for the whole loss as debtors to an indivisible
obligation. X, Inc., as A's answerable employer, was liable to C for
289. Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 723, 124 So. 2d 919, 922 (1948), citing
Costa v. Yochim, 104 La. 170, 28 So. 992 (1900); Brannan, Patterson & Holiday v. Hoel,
15 La. Ann. 308 (1860).
290. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
291. Prior to Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980), a satisfactory approach
for courts in articulating the underlying principles of the master's indemnity action has
been to conclude that the employer and the employee are not solidary obligors. The
following conclusion is that Civil Code article 2103, regarding contribution, is not perti-
nent; it refers only to debtors in solido. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Roy Young, Inc., 308 So.
2d 443, 449 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 240 (La. 1975); Little v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 784, 785-86 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965). Of course, in
the post-Foster world the "no solidarity" reasoning does not suffice. Yet, the conclu-
sion, permitting indemnity by the employer, should not change. The Civil Code ex-
pressly envisions indemnification as a possible recourse by one solidary obligor against
another. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106. Recognition of what the "solidary" obligation means,
in this context, is helpful. Using Professor Johnson's words, "the expression may
simply mean that two persons are bound to the same individual for the same debt,
even though for different reasons." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1977-1978 Term-Obligations, 39 LA. L. REV. 675, 683 (1979) (emphasis added). The
"bound for different reasons" idea is the key phrase. At the core of the employer's in-
demnity action is the theory of article 2106. The employee's negligent conduct causes
him to be the debtor principally concerned with the affair or debt. Simply, the master
is a security insuring that the debt is satisfied, a "deep pocket" in cases in which the
employee tortfeasor is financially unable to pay. T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 154
(1916). For two recent decisions of the indemnity principles in practical application, see
Bewley Furniture Co., Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 285 So. 2d 216 (La. 1973); Jinks v.
McClure, 344 So. 2d 675 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
292. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980); Thomas v. W & W Clarklift,
Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979). See notes 184-94, supra, and accompanying text.
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any amount that C could have required A to pay, which was the
total sum. 93 And the amount exacted from X, Inc. may be retrieved
from A through the indemnity action. Essentially, the presence of B,
C's additional obligor, is unimportant to the examination of the ad-
justment of rights between X, Inc., the employer, and A, its
employee.
However, upon A's requital to X, Inc., simultaneously a right to
contribution should arise"' in A against B either upon a theory of in-
divisibility of the obligation"5 or upon the notion that A and B oc-
cupy a status of solidary obligors vis-i-vis X, Inc., much in the same
fashion as vis-i-vis C, the original creditor. Such a solution comports
with the idea that X, Inc. stands to answer for the wrongs of its
employee and those solidarily bound with the employee as a surety
provided by law. In practice, C could have exacted full payment
from either A or B. Then under Civil Code article 2103, the obliga-
tion deemed in solido towards the creditor, C, is divided of right
among the debtors solidarily bound. Article 2103, however, should
be inapplicable to X, Inc. in the first instance as article 2106 governs
its relations with A and B.296
If C proceeded against B for the whole of the judgment, it ap-
pears unlikely that article 2320 authorizes B to seek contribution
from X, Inc. for A's share of the debt. Placed in the Civil Code
chapter treating recourse for a tort plaintiff, article 2320 seems to
require the employer to answer only to a plaintiff-creditor and not
to any person with a claim against the employee. Certainly, a person
whose imprudent conduct combines with the employee's negligence
may advance only a weak argument that the scope of article 2320 af-
fords aid to his contribution action. The crux of the matter is who is
to bear the risk that A, the employee, may prove insolvent. If B is
required to look directly to A to enforce his contribution right, B is
saddled with the risk. This is as it should be; the chance that one of
the tortfeasors (e.g., the employee) is insolvent is placed upon a
negligent actor and not upon the party (here the employer) who
stood to answer to the plaintiff-creditor in a posture similar to that
of a surety.
Logically, the same analysis should follow if the tort plaintiff-
creditor executes his judgment against X, Inc. The operative legal
principles should not turn upon the pure happenstance that the
293. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320.
294. See Williams v. Marionneaux, 240 La. 713, 124 So. 2d 919 (1960).
295. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2109 & 2113. See notes 190-91, supra, and accompany-
ing text.
296. See note 291, supra.
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plaintiff-creditor sought payment from X, Inc. and not from B, since
both are solidarily liable for the same debt to C. Consequently, X,
Inc., after satisfying the plaintiff-creditor, should be able to press
for indemnification from either A or B.27
Between A and B, article 2103 provides the means for balancing
their responsibilities."8 By dividing the debt between A and B, the
same conclusion is reached as when X, Inc. is authorized to initiate
its indemnity suit against B. B's reparation to X, Inc. triggers a con-
tribution right against A, and A and B "split" the liability for the
award to C.1
The hypothetical situation above should indicate that solidarity
is not a magic incantation which may be substituted for careful con-
sideration of the relative rights between the parties. Rather, the
foreseeable future problems are numerous. Significantly, they in-
clude charting out rationales for solving difficulties in the applica-
tion of article 2318; probing to understand the effect of the "solidary
debtors" characterization in the context of the uncertain state of the
Louisiana "strict liability" puzzle; and the potpourri of confusion
that the introduction of comparative negligence may cause in at-
tempting to bring consistency and certainty to the application of the
concept of solidarity.. A sampling of these difficulties is treated
below.
Article 2318-A Basis for Parental Responsibility
Civil Code article 2318 provides that the parents of a minor
child residing with them are answerable for the damage done
through the minor's delictual conduct. Properly read, article 2318's
underlying policy appears to go hand-in-hand with that of article
2320. In some circumstances, the minor's estate may be able to com-
pensate the tort victim, but the Civil Code represents society's no-
tion that in more instances than not the solvent parties will be the
parents of the wrongdoer. Hence, the parents are made to answer to
297. See note 287, supra.
298. Admittedly, in theory, A and B are not joint tort-feasors and until the effec-
tive date of Act 431 of 1979, Louisiana's comparative negligence act, they could not
properly be called solidary obligors. See 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, amending LA. Civ.
CODE: art. 2324. Yet, in fairness, article 2103 is applied without afterthought so that A
and B share in the whole debt equally.
299. Another matter is whether these principles will obtain under the operation of
comparative negligence in Louisiana. The broad ramifications that Act 431 of 1979 will
spell by bringing comparative fault to Louisiana are beyond the scope of this comment.
Yet, comparative negligence implications are so important in proper assignment of
liability among debtors that certain indemnification and contribution problems and sug-
gestions are discussed below. See notes 348-62, infra, and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff-creditor even though they may not have been person-
ally at fault for his damages.
While some confusion has persisted in the intermediate ap-
pellate courts," the supreme court's Deshotel v. Travelers Indem-
nity Company"0 ' decision a decade ago clearly articulated the reason
for the parent's responsibility-and it is not the product of imputed
negligence. Succinctly, the court ruled that "Article 2318 does not
create negligence in the father because of the minor's negligent acts;
it merely attaches financial responsibility to the father . ... ""'
Deshotel's importance lies in its sure delineation between answer-
ability arising from a relationship and liability as a result of imputed
negligence.' Former Justice Barham, author of the court's opinion,
astutely reflected that, while article 2318 imposes financial respon-
sibility on the parent for a third person's injuries as a result of the
minor's tortious conduct, the answerability is not synonymous 'with
300. Some concepts die hard; the idea that a parent's liability for the wrongful acts
of minor children is supported on the grounds of imputed negligence is one of these
stubborn notions. Prior to Deshotel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d
259 (1971), the uniform jurisprudence in this state was that a parent was imputed with
the negligence of the child as a fault imposing device. For instance, in Bennett v.
Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd, 238 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), the
plaintiff-father stated in his petition that he had sustained injuries in an automobile
operated by his son. Id at 207. The defendant filed the peremptory exceptions of no
cause of action and no right of action on the theory that the father is responsible for
the negligence of his minor son and that the father's imputed negligence barred his ac-
tion. Id. Judge Blanche reasoned that while under article 2320 the negligence of the
employee is not imputed to the employer the situation envisioned by article 2318 is dif-
ferent. However, the Bennett court concluded that the imputation of negligence runs
only in favor of third parties "with the result that ... the negligence of the minor is
imputed to the parent so as to render the parent liable to a third person .... Id. But,
"this imputation of negligence ... does not operate so as to preclude recovery by the
parent directly against the son or his liability insurer." Id. As is apparent, the Bennett
approach is difficult to understand, much less explain. Fortunately, Deshotel's sound
analysis solved the analytic difficulty. For a sampling of decisions noting the problems,
see, e.g., Gaspard v. LeMarie, 245 La. 239, 158 So. 2d 149 (1963); Funderburk v. Millers
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 228 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969); Fontenot v. Pan American
Fire & Cas. Co., 209 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 252 La. 460, 211 So. 2d
328 (1968); Hingle v. Ahten, 43 So. 2d 550 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1950); Epps v. Standard
Supply & Hardware Co., 4 So. 2d 790 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941); DiLeo v. Dumontier,
195 So. 74 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940); Link v. Shreveport Rys. Co., 153 So. 77 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1934).
301. 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971).
302. 257 La. at 573, 243 So. 2d at 261.
303. Professor Crawford, discussing Deshotel, has written that "[tihe noteworthi-
ness of the case lies in the clear distinction recognized by the court between vicarious
responsibility and imputed negligence." The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1970-1971 Term-Torts, 32 LA. L. REV. 213, 218 (1972).
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an imputation of negligence to the parent.'s° Quite simply, liability
arises from the parent-child relationship. If the parent is held to
make whole the innocent victim because the Civil Code so states, as
a policy reflecting upon the family relationships, the same analysis
applicable to the master-servant relationship should obtain. Both
answerable entities are responsible in the nature of sureties for the
creditor's benefit.
True, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Wooten v.
Wimberly... that a parent and child are not solidarily bound for the
debt due to the minor's tort victim.' But a second look at Wooten
may indicate that the foundation for the decision no longer exists. In
Wooten, the plaintiff sued the father of the alleged tortious actor for
injuries done to his child. The minor was found free of negligence,
and the case was dismissed."7 During the period in which that judg-
ment was suspended by a writ request to the supreme court, the
plaintiff instituted a second petition against the child, who had
reached majority."0 The defendant raised the peremptory exception
of prescription," 9 which was maintained. 10 Affirming the dismissal,
in the second suit the supreme court held that the father, the party
defendant in the first suit, and the son, the party defendant in the
second action, were not solidary obligors."'
Consequently, the first petition filed against the father did not
interrupt the running of prescription on the tort against the son. 1
Of course, the real objection to the second litigation of the matter
304. 257 La. at 573, 243 So. 2d at 261.
305. 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973).
306. The Wooten court held that the father was not a solidary co-debtor with his
minor son for the child's alleged tortious conduct. Consequently, the bringing of suit
against the father did not interrupt prescription against the son. See Note, supra note
105; Note, supra note 275.
307. The trial court found young Wimberly free of fault and denied recovery
against the father. The third circuit affirmed, Wooten v. Wimberly, 233 So. 2d 682 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1970), and the supreme court ultimately refused writs. Wooten v.
Wimberly, 256 La. 359, 236 So. 2d 496 (1970).
308. However, Professor Johnson notes that the defendant's brief pointed out that
at the time the first action was filed, the "minor" was of age and could have been sued
in his own capacity. 1972-1973 Term, supra note 105, at 231 n.3.
309, LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 927. The defendant also raised exceptions of res judicata
and imflroper division of a cause of action, and a plea of collateral estoppel.
310. The trial court and the court of appeal sustained the exception of prescription
without reaching the other exceptions. 272 So. 2d at 304.
311. Id. at 307.
312. Professor Johnson has summarized the impact of Wooten by writing that "[i]n
ruling against plaintiff and affirming the dismissal on a plea of prescription, the
supreme court held that a parent is not solidarily liable with a minor child for the torts
of that child." 1972-1973 Term, supra note 105, at 231-32.
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was that the plaintiff attempted to re-try the same question
previously decided against him, i.e., whether the minor child's
negligence had caused plaintiff's injuries."' Viewed in this light, it is
understandable that the supreme court was highly receptive to an
answer that would dismiss the second suit and remain consistent
with the Civil Code; Cox v. Shreveport Packing Company"1 ' provided
an instant analogy. In 1948 the Louisiana Supreme Court held in
Cox that an employer is not solidarily liable with his servants for
the latter's torts."' Given that the policy justifications for both arti-
cle 2318 and article 2320 are very similar, it was reasonable to look
to the interpretation of one for guidance in interpreting the other.
At the time Wooten was decided, and even now, the analogy was
sound. Neither article specifically stipulates that the parent of the
employer is solidarily bound with his familial or contractual relation.
In addition, article 2093 provides that a solidary status is not
presumed and must be expressly stipulated.3 1 1
However, once Foster v. Hampton37 overruled Cox, and held
that an employer and an employee are solidarily bound to the tort
plaintiff-creditor, victim of the employee's negligence, Wooten's
future was in doubt. Foster represents the "judicial reconsideration"
called for some time ago regarding Wooten's classification of deb-
tors."' Now that Cox, the underpinning for the Wooten court's
analysis, is obsolete, it seems certain that article 2318 places the
parents and the minor child in a position of solidarity vis-a-vis the
creditor.
But, as between or among the debtors, the child and the parents
should be viewed in the same fashion as the employer and the em-
ployee: One of the debtors is obliged to the plaintiff by reason of his
negligence fault, while the other obligors are answerable merely
because the Civil Code so states.1 Thus, the parent who is made to
313. Id.
314. 213 La. 53, 34 So. 2d 373 (1948).
315. Although Cox did not address a factual situation involving the liability of a
parent for a minor child's actions, the court did analogize the master's answerability to
that of the father and found that neither instance imposed solidarity. Primarily, the
conclusion as to no solidarity turned on a reading of article 2093. Article 2093 requires
that solidarity be expressly stipulated. Articles 2318 and 2320, while providing the ele-
ments of vicarious liability or relational responsibility, do not stipulate solidarity.
316. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2093. See text at note 114, supra. The absence of an ex-
press provision of solidarity in article 2318 swayed four justices in Wooten; "the law
which creates the solidary obligation should clearly set forth the requisite elements of
a solidarity obligation." 272 So. 2d at 305.
317. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
318. 1972-1973 Term, supra note 105, at 237.
319. Once the creditor has been satisfied, through payment by the entity responsi-
ble solely because the Civil Code requires him to be a debtor in the plaintiffs favor,
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pay for damages occasioned by his minor child's delictual behavior
has an action against the child's estate for indemnity, if feasible."'
Furthermore, if a third person's negligence concurred with the
wrongful conduct of the minor to cause a single, indivisible damage
to the plaintiff, the parent of the child, should he have to make good
the entire judgment to the plaintiff, should have an indemnity action
against the third person."' In all pertinent respects the analysis of
the parent-child liability situation under article 2318 should follow
the guides suggested for article 2320 examination. 2
Strict Liability and Solidary Obligors
Ten years ago the concept of strict liability was so alien to Lou-
isiana tort law that the seminal products liability decision, Weber v.
Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company,23 was ostensibly a neg-
the respective rights between the debtors may be adjusted according to respective
degrees of wrongdoing.
320. Although the situation may be rare, the minor child's estate could possess suf-
ficient wealth so that an indemnity action would be possible. However, as a matter of
public policy the suit would likely fall. A court probably would not permit the action,
maintaining an exception of no right of action as intra-family suits are not favored in
the law. The practical recourse of the parent seeking indemnity is against the child's
insurer and not the minor.
One instance when indemnity would not be available is when the parent is the only
debtor to the creditor-plaintiff for the child's wrongful conduct. This is the Turner v.
Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975), situation. The financial responsibility of the parent is
not predicated upon the child's negligence when the minor is beneath the age of
discernment. In short, "[t]he fact that the conduct was tortious when measured by nor-
mal standards is enough to render the father liable therefor." Id. at 277. The parents
and the child are not solidarily bound for the creditor's benefit; the child is not even an
obligor. Since the parents are without recourse, they and their insurers must absorb
the loss.
321. Since the minor, whose careless action concurred with the third party's negli-
gence, is likely to be insolvent in nearly all cases, an argument can be made that arti-
cle 2318 permits a wider range of claimants to demand payment from the parents than
article 2320 requires the employer to answer. While article 2318 exists primarily for
the benefit of the plaintiff-creditor, it may also be read as stating that parents are
liable to all who possess rights against their minor child. This interpretation follows
for two reasons. First, the civil law, with its affection for family relationships, views
the parent-child relation as more encompassing and closer than the purely contractual
relationship between employer and employee. Second, a legislative intent, expressed in
article 2103, to permit a tortfeasor to seek contribution from another solidarily bound
tortfeasor would be thwarted in almost all instances if the concurrently negligent third
person is relegated to seeking contribution from the minor child and not the parents.
In the article 2320 context, the likelihood that the employee is impoverished, and
unable to contribute, is more remote.
322. See notes 198-275, supra, and accompanying text.
323. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
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ligence action.2 Since that time, however, Louisiana courts have
developed a type of strict liability through interpretations of the
Civil Code to impose responsibility without negligence."' Perhaps
one of the most significant judicial constructions of the Civil Code in
finding strict liability has been with respect to latent brake
defects.2 In Arceneaux v. Domingue327 the plaintiff brought suit for
damages resulting from a rear-end collision by the defendant's auto-
mobile. The defendants argued that the cause of the accident was
the unexplained failure of the car's brakes. 28 A jury verdict for the
defendants was affirmed by the third circuit."2 Reversing the deci-
sion, the supreme court extended the Loescher rule3 ° to cover the
non-apparent, flawed brake. As one commentator has written,
"[w]ith this utilization of article 2317 in Arceneaux, the court effec-
tively applies strict liability to brake defect cases in Louisiana." '31
324. See Crawford, Products Liability, The Cause of Action, 22 LA. B.J. 239 (1975).
Professor Crawford has maintained since Weber was decided that the decision is an
application of the law of negligence. Logically, then, contributory negligence should be
available as a defense for the manufacturer-defendant. Despite the lapse of nearly ten
years since Weber was announced, the issue has not been settled. See Chappuis v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978). However, the United States Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Louisiana law, has ruled that the action is not
based in negligence and that contributory negligence is not a viable defense. Khoder v.
AMF, Inc., 539 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1976). For an excellent treatment of Louisiana pro-
ducts liability law, see Robertson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Products in
Louisiana Law, 50 TUL. L. REV. 50 (1975).
325. See, e.g., Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978); Olsen v. Shell
Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1978); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975); Turner
v. Bucher, 308 So. 2d 270 (La. 1975); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113 (La. 1974);
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971). See also Andrus,
Strict Liability Under Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318, and 2321: An Initial Analysis, 25
LA. B.J. 105 (1977); Comment, Fault of the Victim: The Limits of Liability Under Civil
Code Articles 2317, 2318, and 2321, 38 LA. L. REV. 995 (1978).
326. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978); Note, supra note 212.
327. 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978).
328. Domingue testified that the brake pedal "suddenly and without forewarning"
went to the floor when he tried to stop. Id. at 1332.
329. The supreme court noted that the court of appeal affirmation was not pub-
lished.
330. When harm results from the conduct or defect of a person or thing which
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, a person legally responsible under
these code articles [2317, 2318, 2320, 2321, and 23221 for the supervision, care, or
guardianship of the person or thing may be held liable for the damage thus
caused, despite the fact that no personal negligent act or inattention on the
former's part is proved. The liability arises from his legal relationship to the per-
son or thing whose conduct or defect creates an unreasonable risk of injuries to
others.
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441, 446 (La. 1975).
331. Note, supra note 212, at 855.
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The result is achieved by deleting the requirement of proof of negli-
gence from the latent brake defect action.3 2 In short, the owner of
an automobile with brakes that are flawed so as to create an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to another would be liable without negligence
on his part when another sustains injury caused by the defective
condition of the brakes.
Given the treatment of latent brake defects in Louisiana law,
problems in apportioning responsibility among obligors, who may be
termed solidarily bound for the creditor's benefit, may arise when
the unreasonably dangerous condition of the brakes exists at the
time the automobile was purchased. The following situation is il-
lustrative: X purchases a new automobile from Y, the car dealer,
which was manufactured by Z. Soon afterwards, while driving, X
depresses the brake pedal to no avail, and the vehicle crashes into
P's car. In view of the policy articulated in Thomas and Foster, it is
not beyond the imagination that a court would classify X, Y, and Z
as solidary obligors, bound for P's benefit.
Despite Weber's inclusion of P into the class of persons able to
maintain a tort action against the defective product's manufac-
turer, 3' X may be a more attractive party to sue, particularly if he
is insured."3 The reasons why X is more likely to defend P's action
are simple. Against the manufacturer, the plaintiff must demon-
strate that the thing, in this situation the brakes, was defective, i e.,
unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectations of a reasonable
consumer.3 In addition, the plaintiff must prove that the product
was in its defective state when it left the manufacturer's control. 6
Admittedly, the plaintiff's burden of proof is somewhat lessened
through the use of analytic evidentiary aids.3 ' But, on the whole, the
332. Id
333. A manufacturer of a product which involves a risk of injury to the user may
be liable to "any person, whether the purchaser or a third person . Weber v.
Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 602, 250 So. 2d 754, 755 (1971).
334. LA. R.S. 32:861 (Supp. 1977) requires every self-propelled motor vehicle regis-
tered in this state to be covered by a motor vehicle liability policy with a limit of not
less than $5,000.
335. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 359 (1976).
336. Professors Noel and Phillips write that an essential element of the plaintiff's
case is to show the existence of an injury-causing defect at the time the product left
the defendant's control. Id.
337. The Louisiana Supreme Court made it clear in Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins.
Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971), that the plaintiff need not prove any particular
defect in the manufacture or design of the product. The plaintiff need only produce suf-
ficient circumstantial evidence that the most reasonable hypothesis for the cause of his
damages is a defect in defendant's product. The plaintiffs evidence need not exclude
all other possible explanations for his harm, other than a defect, but must exclude
other just as reasonable hypotheses.
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plaintiff's suit against the owner of the automobile with defective
brakes is considerably easier. Against X, P may rely on a presump-
tion of negligence theory,"8 in addition to arguing that his damage
was caused by the unreasonably dangerous condition of a thing,
brakes, owned by X. The point in time when the brakes became
unreasonably dangerous, or defective, is of no moment to P if the
suit is against X. Thus, it is not unlikely that P may take judgment
solely against X. 3
If such a situation arises, X should be permitted recourse
against either Y 40 or Z, or both. Procedurally, X may assert his
right via third party demand " ' or after he has satisfied P's judg-
ment. Substantively, X might allege that as the vehicle proved to
have a vice in its construction severe in its consequences, it may be
presumed that had he known of the flaw he would not have purchased
the automobile. 2 Against Y, the dealer, the redhibitory claim may
prove unsatisfactory unless X can show that Y was aware of the
defective condition of the brakes at the time of the sale and was a
bad faith seller.3 On the other hand, as a manufacturer of goods is
presumed to know of the vices in his products," X's demand from Z
appears more plausible. The proper recovery includes, as consequen-
tial damages, both the injuries actually sustained by X and the sum
he was compelled to pay to P.3 5 Even aside from a notion of redhibi-
tion or tort action by X against the automobile manufacturer, X
should be allowed full recovery of any amount he was made to pay
P.
338. Note, supra note 212, at 857.
339. In practice, the judgment will be enforced against X's insurer, up to the limits
of liability coverage.
340. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520.
341. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1111. Contribution or indemnity may be enforced by call-
ing in the co-debtor in the original action. Additionally, article 1113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides that a defendant who does not bring in as a third party
defendant a person who is liable to him for all or part of the principal demand does not
lose his action against that person. Thus, a separate suit is permitted. However, the
separate action cannot be asserted if the person from whom contribution or indemnity
is sought proves that he had a valid defense to the principal action which was not rais-
ed. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1113. See Comment, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors,
22 LA. L. REV. 818 (1962).
342. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520.
343. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2531. See Spillers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 294 So.
2d 803 (La. 1974); McCauley v. Manda Bros. Provisions Co., Inc., 252 La. 528, 211 So.
2d 637 (1968).
344. See, e.g., Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 2d 926 (La. 1978); Weber
v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971); Penn v. Inferno Mfg. Co.,
199 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 251 La. 27, 202 So. 2d 649 (1967).
345. See Appalachian Corp., Inc. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 91 So.
539 (1922).
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In the instant situation, X was P's debtor merely because X
owned the thing that caused P's damages. But X did not have any
part to play in the making of the thing containing the unreasonably
dangerous flaw; as the defect, by definition, could not be seen, X
was not in a position to protect P from the risk he encountered. Yet,
to insure that innocent tort victims are fully compensated for their
injuries, article 2317, as an expression of society's sense of justice,
says that X is liable to P because X owned the harming instrument,
without more. With P satisfied, the reason for requiring X to
answer disappears. In fact, society's sense of fairness is offended if
the party who is ultimately responsible for the creation of the un-
reasonable risk of harm, the manufacturer, is not shouldered with
the entire debt. Of all the potential obligors, automobile owner,
retail vendor, and manufacturer, only one, the manufacturer, has
within its power the ability to modify its future conduct and to
eliminate the danger which caused injury. Upon this entity, then,
the complete loss should fall as a means of encouraging better and
safer future behavior. 4
However, further complicating the scenario is the likely event
that X's insurer, and not X, will pay P's award. Although the Civil
Code ostensibly provides a right of subrogation to X's rights when
the insurer satisfies the judgment,347 it is uncertain whether the in-
surer could be subrogated to X's position as a purchaser. Additional-
ly, a court might reason that as the insurer is in the business of
spreading risks, it should not be allowed an indemnity claim against
the automobile manufacturer. Rather, contribution might be all that
is permitted. Such reasoning is incorrect primarily for failing to
grasp the fundamental concept of placing the entire loss, as between
debtors strictly and solidarily liable to the plaintiff-creditor, upon
the entity with the opportunity to prevent future harms. In the case
of a insurer, subrogated to the rights of its insured motor vehicle
owner bringing suit against the manufacturer, indemnity should be
granted just as if the party pursuing recovery were the insured.
While the circumstances in which one or more of a number of
obligors strictly liable to the creditor should be allowed indemnity
346. The authors are aware of the somewhat fictional position inherent in rational-
izing tort damage awards as a deterrent device preventing future misbehavior. By
definition, negligent conduct is unintentional and unthinking. However, as a society,
we believe that exacting a sum of money from a defendant will encourage him to act
more reasonably in the future. And, in the products liability context, the argument has
some merit. One need only think of the product design changes, incorporating safety
features, and quality control measures taken by manufacturers to realize the dramatic
impact tort law has effected on industrial society in the past two decades.
347. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2161.
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actions against one or more debtors appear somewhat limited, the
fundamental analysis remains the same. After the creditor is sat-
isfied, a determination should be made about which obligor (or
obligors) has the opportunity to modify the dangerous conduct in the
future. In addition, an examination should be made to identify which
obligor or bbligors were answerable to the creditor solely from the
happenstance of owning something that harmed the plaintiff. Con-
sidering the problem from this perspective, a court might well allow
an indemnity claim or claims even among solidarily and strictly
bound debtors.
Comparing Faults-The Impact of Act 431 of 1979
Act 431 of 1979, Louisiana's comparative fault legislation, has
been described as deceptively simple.141 And, with respect to deter-
mining rights among obligors solidarily bound to the plaintiff-cred-
itor, the effect of comparative fault is rather limited. Yet, the few
changes are significant.
Article 2324 has been amended to provide a statutory expres-
sion of solidarity for persons whose concurring fault causes harm to
another34 9 in addition to the express provision of solidarity for joint
tort-feasors that has existed previously.3 5 ' Hence, the conceptual
problems that arose when the courts described concurrently neg-
ligent actors who caused a single injury as "joint tort-feasors ' ' 33 1 are
solved. The Civil Code now provides in express terms that concur-
rently negligent tortfeasors are solidary obligors. However, when
the plaintiff's own fault contributes to his damages, "a judgment
debtor shall not be liable for more than the degree of his fault to a
348. Chamallas, supra note 11, at 373. For a detailed analysis of Act 431, see
Johnson, supra note 283; Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault
Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343 (1980); Plant, Comparative
Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403 (1980); Wade, Comparative
Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louis-
iana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299 (1980). For a general discussion of some of the peculiar Lou-
isiana problems with comparative fault, see Brown, Comparative Negligence Would
Not Work in Louisiana, 24 LA. B.J. 173 (1976); Comment, Comparative Negligence in
the United States-The Advent of Its Adoption in Louisiana, 51 TUL. L. REV. 1217
(1977).
349. Persons whose concurring fault has caused injury, death or loss to another are
• . . answerable, in solido; provided, however, when the amount of recovery has
been reduced in accordance with the preceding article, a judgment debtor shall
not be liable for more than the degree of his fault to a judgment creditor to whom
a greater degree of negligence has been attributed, reserving to all parties their
respective rights of indemnity and contribution.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324.
350. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324.
351. See notes 178-97, supra, and accompanying text.
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judgment creditor to whom a greater degree of negligence has been
attributed . . . ""' Therefore, in a situation in which the plaintiff is
ruled to have been 50 percent at fault and debtors A and B each 25
percent at fault, the plaintiff could not seek all of his award from A
or B, even if A and B are solidarily liable.
Additionally, article 2103 has been amended to state that
"[w]hen two or more debtors are liable in solido... the obligation ...
shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault."3 3 But the
statutory language does not resolve the perplexing questions that
arise when analyzing the adjustment of rights among the debtors,
liable in solido for the creditor's benefit, after the creditor has been
satisfied, when one or more of the debtors is answerable to the
creditor only in the nature of a security. 5 The following hypothet-
ical situation may aid in clarifying that which has been changed and
in identifying those difficulties for which the courts will have to pro-
vide resolution. A, while acting in the course and scope of his
employment for Z, Co., and B are concurrently negligent in causing
C's damages. C brings suit against A, B, and Z, Co. At trial, the jury
returns special written findings determining A and B to have been
80 percent at fault, 40 percent each, with C contributing the remain-
ing 20 percent. 55 As noted above, amended article 2324, in accord
with prior jurisprudence, holds A and B solidarily liable to C. Fur-
thermore, Louisiana law provides Z, Co. as a solidary obligor with
A 56 and B151 for C's benefit. Thus, the creditor, C, may execute the
whole judgment against Z, Co."'6 Once Z, Co. has fully satisfied C,
the question arises as to the permissible recourse available against
A and B. As B is a party outside of the employment relationship, un-
doubtedly Z, Co. would desire full recovery from B; in approaching
the problem, at least two avenues are open to the Louisiana courts.
First, Z, Co. may be allowed in an indemnity action against B
recovery of any amount that Z, Co. was compelled to pay the plain-
tiff-creditor. B could then bring a contribution claim against A.151
Such a solution seems sound.
While Z, Co. was a solidary obligor in C's favor, its answerabil-
ity was not the product of its wrongdoing or negligence; rather, Z,
Co.'s fault was merely technical in nature-Z, Co. employed A, one
352. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2324.
353. 1979 La. Acts, No. 431, amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 2103.
354. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106. See notes 287-91, supra, and accompanying text.
355. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1811.
356. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980).
357. Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So. 2d 375 (La. 1979).
358. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2091.
359. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103.
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of the concurrently negligent tortfeasors. Consequently, it is uncer-
tain whether article 2103's call for debtors liable in solido to divide
the obligation according to their respective fault6 ° is applicable. In-
stead, article 2106, authorizing an indemnity action by the security
on the creditor's behalf against the obligor who was principally con-
cerned with the debt, seems to govern.
On the other hand, a court might reason that Z, Co. cannot re-
quire B to pay more than B's percentage of fault multiplied by the
damage award-even though Z, Co. as a debtor solidarily bound to C
was compelled to make good the entire award. For instance, if the
plaintiff's allowed recovery, after reduction for his 20 percent con-
tributing fault, is $8,000, a court might allow Z, Co. to maintain an
action against B for only $4,000, following Z, Co.'s full payment to
the plaintiff. Although seemingly incongruous with the notion that
the solidary obligor only technically liable should be permitted reim-
bursement from any one of the other debtors responsible because of
his wrongdoing, this second approach may be adopted by the courts
for its desirable policy features. If Z, Co., the employer, is allowed
an indemnity action against B, the concurrently negligent third party,
the result will be the commencement of another lawsuit, since B will
certainly seek contribution from A. But, if Z, Co. is permitted only a
$4,000 recovery, and is forced to look to A, its employee, the second
lawsuit probably will never occur26 ' The judicial policy of limiting
litigation is served. Secondly, if the employee, A, proves to be insol-
vent, his employer, and not the third party, should absorb the loss. 6 '
After all, the employer's business enterprise created at least part of
the risk that injured the plaintiff-a portion measured by the trier
of fact to be 40 percent.
These difficulties, and other problem areas in the Louisiana com-
parative fault scheme, await judicial articulation and resolution.
However, when these issues are addressed, one should remember
that, in passing Act 431 of 1979, the legislature was concerned pri-
marily with relationships between a creditor and debtor(s) and not
360. In addition, it is unclear whether article 2103's fault reference encompasses
non-negligent or legal fault. If it does not, article 2106 provides the only means by
which liabilities among debtors solidarily bound can be adjusted, after the creditor is
satisfied.
361. One commentator has written that "[in the past, employers have rarely
brought such actions against their negligent workers." Comment, supra note 228, at
79. See also James, Indemnity, Subrogation, and Contribution and the Efficient Dis-
tribution of Accident Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360 (1958).
362. But if the employer is viewed only as an aid for the plaintiff-creditor's benefit,
then should not the chance that the employee is unable to contribute to his co-debtors
fall upon an actual tortfeasor and not upon a security?
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the adjustment of rights among debtors, especially when one or
more of the obligors is only technically at fault or statutorily respon-
sible. Hence, it is submitted that the better course for future anal-
ysis is the application of article 2106-granting the technically
answerable debtor indemnity against those obligors whose acts re-
sulted in the obligation itself.
Bruce V. Schewe
Martha Quinn Thomas
